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THE VALUE OF AMATEURISM
CODY J. MCDAVIS*
Our chief interest should not lie in the great champions in sport.
On the contrary, our concern should be most of all to widen the
base, the foundation, in athletic sports: to encourage in every
way a healthy rivalry which shall give to the largest possible
number of students the chance to take part in vigorous outdoor
games.1
- President Theodore Roosevelt
I. INTRODUCTION
Collegiate athletic programs are a defining feature at many of the higher
education institutions sprawling across North America.2 Placing a spotlight on
the athletic programs makes sense for most institutions. It is an effective way
to engage with the local community and, in many cases, the national community
as well.3 This exposure has proven to increase new student applications,

* Cody J. McDavis is a former Division I Men’s Basketball Student-Athlete. McDavis is expected to
graduate with a Juris Doctor from the University of California, Los Angeles School of Law in May 2019. He
received a Bachelor of Science in Finance in 2015 from the University of Northern Colorado. McDavis would
like to thank Professor Steven K. Derian (a former Division I football and baseball player at the University of
California, Berkeley) for his guidance and insightful comments throughout the writing process.
1. President Theodore Roosevelt, Speech Before the Harvard Students (Feb. 23, 1907), in SPALDING’S
OFFICIAL FOOT BALL GUIDE, Aug. 1907, at 9. President Roosevelt is credited for having a major hand in the
creation of the NCAA. See Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National College Athletic Association’s
Role in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS. L. REV. 9, 10-13 (2000). Roosevelt sought
to preserve amateurism and mitigate the unsavory violence in collegiate sport. Id.
2. University presidents have been quoted as considering their athletics program as the “front porch” to
their university. See KNIGHT COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: QUANTITATIVE AND
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH WITH FOOTBALL BOWL SUBDIVISION UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS ON THE COSTS AND
FINANCING OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS – REPORT OF FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 43 (2009) [hereinafter KNIGHT COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS]; see also Dawn Rhodes, With NCAA Success,
Loyola Now Looks for Gains Off the Court, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 21, 2018, https://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/college/ct-met-loyola-basketball-university-publicity-20180321-story.html (“The bottom line
is [the basketball team’s success] gives the university a chance to tell its story in a very broad, public way.”).
3. KNIGHT COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, supra note 2, at 44. “Athletics builds
allegiance to the institution and brings national prominence and pride.” Id.
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especially where the athletic teams win.4 Additionally, collegiate athletics
provide institutions with a means to maintain their relationship with their alumni
base, which is often a significant source for funding.5
Within the athletic departments themselves, it is Division I Men’s
Basketball and the Football Bowl Subdivision (“FBS Football”) that typically
garner the most attention.6 Commonly referred to as the Revenue Generating
Sports, Division I men’s basketball and FBS football outperform their sibling
sport teams in revenue generation at most institutions.7 The collegiate sport

4. Rhodes, supra note 2. Loyola University Chicago’s undergraduate admissions page had a 50 percent
increase in new visitors during their historic NCAA basketball tournament run. Id. Florida Gulf Coast
University and Lehigh University saw new student application increases of 27.5 percent and 9.2 percent,
respectively, the year after their mens basketball teams experienced success in the NCAA postseason
tournament. Polly Mosendz et al., NCAA Tournament 2017: What March Madness is Worth to a College,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-03-13/march-madnessmore-students-apply-to-schools-that-break-brackets (noting an “average 4 percent increase for all schools that
participated in the NCAA tournament from 2010 to 2014.”). See Ahmed E. Taha, Are College Athletes
Economically Exploited?, 2 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 69, 74 (2012) (noting a 22 percent increase in
freshman applications after George Mason University’s men’s basketball team made it to the Final Four of
the Division I Men’s Basketball Championship tournament); KNIGHT COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE
ATHLETICS, supra note 2, at 11 (“A significant majority of FBS presidents believe that athletics success
provides substantial benefits to their institutions. These include tangible benefits such as increasing
applications, quality of the student body, and donations to the university.”).
5. One economist estimates that winning five games more than in the previous year can result in increased
alumni donations of 28% for a school. See Michael Anderson, The Benefits of College Athletic Success: An
Application of the Propensity Score Design with Instrumental Variables 18 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 18196, 2012) (concluding that FBS football schools that win may expect increases in
alumni athletic donations, among other things such as enhances in the school’s academic reputation, increases
in the number of applicants, reduced acceptance rates, and increased average incoming SAT scores); see also
Taha, supra note 4, at 106 (noting the 25% increase in active alumni and a 52% increase in fundraising for
the George Mason University athletic department after a successful men’s basketball season); Brad Wolverton
et al., The $10-Billion Sports Tab, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 15, 2015), http://www.chronicle.com/interactives/ncaa-subsidies-main#id=table_2014 (“College leaders say such investments [in football] help attract
prospective students and build connections with donors and other supporters.”).
6. See B. David Ridpath, The College Football Playoff and Other NCAA Revenues Are an Exposé of
Selfish Interest, FORBES, Jan. 17, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/bdavidridpath/2017/01/17/college-football-playoff-and-other-ncaa-revenues-is-an-expose-of-selfish-interest/#27f01704e1af.
This rule is not
without its exceptions, however. Several universities are more well known for sports other than men’s
basketball or FBS football. See, e.g., Jeff Kolpack, All Individual Sports at NDSU, UND Lose Money,
BISMARCK TRIB., Apr. 7, 2017, http://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/all-individual-sports-atndsu-und-lose-money/article_a9ea7b3f-6826-5348-8cb5-d0eadb369df0.html (referring to the University of
North Dakota’s hockey program as the crown jewel of collegiate athletics in North Dakota); see also Zach
Helfand, The Road to Cal State Fullerton Baseball Greatness is Littered with Parking Tickets, L.A. TIMES,
May 29, 2017, http://www.latimes.com/sports/la-sp-fullerton-baseball-20170529-story.html (describing Cal
State Fullerton as a “one-sport wonder” while revisiting the storied success of its baseball team).
7. DANIEL L. FULKS, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOC., NCAA REVENUES AND EXPENSES OF
DIVISION I INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS REPORT: FISCAL YEARS 2004 THROUGH 2015, at 36,
62, 88 (2016), http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D1REVEXP2015.pdf (providing a
sport-by-sport breakdown of generated revenues where basketball and football far exceed all other sports in
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landscape will likely continue to be dominated by these two sports for some
time. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) recently signed its
most lucrative television agreement to date for the broadcasting rights to the
Men’s Basketball Championship through 2032.8 The Big 10, one of the five
major NCAA conferences, recently inked a six-year multibillion-dollar deal for
the television rights of their Men’s Basketball and FBS Football programs.9 All
of the major conferences have followed suit.10
Nationwide popularity and high dollar value television agreements have
paved way for the construction of unprecedented college football stadiums and
basketball arenas. The Carrier Dome, home to the Syracuse Orange, can sit
49,262 attendees.11 The University of Tennessee stadium holds 106,000
spectators.12 Michigan football’s “The Big House” seats an impressive 107,601
spectators.13 For comparison, the largest capacity National Football League
(NFL) stadium seats 100,000.14 Across the country, on television and in the
stadium, millions of fans are engaging with collegiate sport and this wild
popularity has shown no signs of letting up.
While revenues, viewership, and seating capacity have grown, one thing has
remained largely the same—student-athletes may not receive cash compensation.15
The NCAA caps student-athlete financial aid at cost of
revenues generated with the limited exception of ice hockey). At least for football, this has been true for
almost a century. HOWARD J. SAVAGE ET AL., CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING,
AMERICAN COLLEGE ATHLETICS 83, 87 (1929) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT].
8. Marc Tracy, N.C.A.A. Extends Basketball Deal with CBS Sports and Turner Through 2032, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/13/sports/ncaabasketball/ncaa-extends-basketballdeal-with-cbs-sports-and-turner-through-2032.html. The television agreement, beginning in 2010, is worth
$10.8 billion through 2024 and an additional $8.8 billion between 2024 and 2032.
9. Roman Stubbs, Big Ten Formally Announces Six-Year Media Rights Deal with ESPN, FOX, and CBS,
WASH. POST, July 24, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/terrapins-insider/wp/2017/07/24/bigten-formally-announces-six-year-media-rights-deal-with-espn-fox-and-cbs/?utm_term=.0defb2381a9f.
10. Kristi Dosh, College TV Rights Deals Undergo Makeovers, ESPN (May 13, 2012),
http://www.espn.com/blog/playbook/dollars/post/_/id/705/ (summarizing the multi-billion-dollar deals of the
major NCAA conferences).
11. History at a Glance - Carrier Dome, CARRIER DOME: SYRACUSE U., http://carrierdome.com/history/default.aspx (last visited Dec. 13, 2018).
12. Robert Sandy, The Economics of US Intercollegiate Sports and the NCAA, in HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF SPORT 389, 389 (Edward Elgar 2006).
13. Michigan Stadium, U. MICH., http://www.mgoblue.com/sports/2017/6/16/facilities-michigan-stadium-html.aspx (last visited Dec. 13, 2018). Like the Rose Bowl, the University of Michigan’s stadium is
quite old, but has been renovated and greatly expanded at a significant cost. Id.
14. AT&T Stadium, HKS ARCHITECTS, http://www.hksinc.com/places/cowboys-stadium-2/ (last visited
Dec. 13, 2018).
15. This is strictly speaking, of course. It is true that student-athlete’s financial aid beyond the costs
associated with attending a university have never grown; they have always been zero. However, if one were
to consider the increased costs associated with attending a university—arguably one way of valuing a full
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attendance.16 The value of a cost of attendance scholarship can be substantial.17
However, many argue that student-athletes are entitled to more.18 These critics
point to the “highly commercialized, multibillion dollar endeavor” that is the
NCAA and claim that it is “profoundly immoral” to restrict student-athletes’
compensation “while everyone else profits.”19 Of the five major collegiate
scholarship—as a form of increased compensation for student-athletes, a different conclusion would be had
altogether. For example, in 1949, UCLA estimated a maximum annual in-state resident cost of attendance of
$1,243. University of California, General Catalogue, U.C. BULLETIN (Aug. 10, 1949), http://www.registrar.ucla.edu/Portals/50/Documents/catalog-archive/1900-1949/49-50catalog.pdf. For the 2017-18 academic
year, UCLA estimates an annual in-state resident cost of attendance to be $33,604. Financial Aid and
Scholarships – Cost of Attendance, UCLA FINANCIAL AID AND SCHOLARSHIPS, http://www.financialaid.ucla.edu/Undergraduate/Cost-of-Attendance#495791584-residence-halls (last visited Dec. 13, 2018).
Viewed from this perspective, the student-athlete today enjoys an inflation-adjusted compensation increase
of 167.57%.
16. Cost of attendance scholarships were recently introduced by the NCAA in 2015. NCAA, 2017-18
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 15, 15.1, at 198 (Aug. 1, 2017) (allowing cost of attendance scholarships)
[hereinafter NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL]. Prior to 2015, the NCAA restricted scholarships to Grant-in-Aid.
NCAA, 2014-15 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 15, 15.1, at 190 (Aug. 1, 2014) (capping scholarship value
at grant-in-aid). See Cost of Attendance Q&A, NCAA (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2015-09-03/cost-attendance-qa (announcing cost of attendance scholarship being permitted in the NCAA).
17. Estimates vary. One study finds a men’s basketball scholarship to be worth $120 thousand per year.
See Jay Weiner & Steve Berkowitz, USA Today Analysis Finds $120k Value in Men’s Basketball Scholarship,
USA TODAY, Mar. 30, 2011, https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketball/2011-03-29scholarship-worth-final-four_N.htm; see also Jeffrey Dorfman, Pay College Athletes? They’re Already Paid
Up To $125,000 Per Year, FORBES, Aug. 29, 2013, https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffreydorfman/2013/08/29/pay-college-athletes-theyre-already-paid-up-to-125000year/#358d980e2b82 (valuing a
college athletic scholarship at $125 thousand per year); Patrick Rishe, Value of College Football Scholarship
Exceeds $2 Million for College Football’s Top 25, FORBES, Aug. 21, 2011,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/prishe/2011/08/21/value-of-college-football-scholarship-exceeds-2-millionfor-college-footballs-top-25/#78edbf9619ef (estimating the total value of a top college football scholarship to
exceed $2.2 million). But see Estimated Value of a Full 2014-2015 Indiana University Athletic Scholarship,
IND. UNIV. ATHLETICS
(Sept.
15,
2014),
http://iuhoosiers.com/documents/2015/5/21/genrel_2014_15_misc_non_event__Sept2014CostScholarship.pdf (valuing a four-year Indiana University scholarship at $135,766 for in-state students and $240,274 for out-of-state students).
18. See Travis Waldron, A Trip to the Men’s Room Turned Jeff Kessler Into the NCAA’s Worst Nightmare,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/jeffrey-kessler-ncaa-lawsuit_us_59723f33e4b00e4363df3f59 (discussing Jeffrey Kessler, the plaintiffs’ attorney in the current NCAA
antitrust litigation, and his belief that college athletes should be better compensated); Rick Maese, Jay Bilas
vs. NCAA: How a Former Player with a Law Degree Became an Agent of Change, WASH. POST, Nov. 12,
2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/jay-bilas-vs-ncaa-how-a-former-player-with-a-lawdegree-became-an-agent-of-change/2014/11/12/7f4254ee-6a7d-11e4-bafd6598192a448d_story.html?utm_term=.9c6845a0db7e (discussing former Duke men’s basketball player, Jay
Bilas, as the “grand marshal” of the movement to “do away with the notion of amateurism [and] pay college
athletes.”).
19. Jay Bilas, College Athletes Should Be Compensated, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/03/13/ncaa-and-the-interests-of-student-athletes/college-athletes-should-becompensated. See Derek Van Rheenen, Exploitation in College Sports: Race, Revenue, and Educational
Reward, 48 INT’L REV. SOC. SPORT 550, 2 (2012) (noting that critics believe collegiate sport is a “form of
systematic exploitation, perpetuated by the . . . (NCAA) and its member institutions against college athletes.”).
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conferences,20 for example, the lowest median salary for football coaches was
just over $2.5 million in 2016.21 Athletic Directors of these conferences are
well-compensated, too. In 2011, athletic directors at FBS Football schools had
an average salary of roughly $515,000.22
A deeper dive arguably suggests that the commonly cited salary statistics
and television contracts are misleading by their failure to indicate the financial
prosperity, or lack thereof, of the NCAA membership.23 For example, of the
351 Division I institutions,24 only 24 reported positive net generated revenues
in 2015.25 The median net generated revenues for Division I as a whole hovered
around negative $12 million during that same year.26 The so-called “revenue
generating sports” of men’s basketball and football were only profitable at a rate
of fifty-five and fifty percent, respectively, during that same period.27
Today, in 2018, the NCAA maintains that collegiate sports are not as
profitable as many are led to believe: “[W]omen’s basketball, in particular,
almost everywhere generates less revenue than its costs, while men’s basketball

20. Also known as the “Autonomous Five,” the “Power Five,” or the “Big Five,” the five major collegiate
conferences are the Pacific Coast Conference (PAC-12); Big 12 Conference; Big Ten Conference;
Southeastern Conference (SEC); and the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC). See Kent Babb, NCAA Board of
Directors Approves Autonomy for ‘Big Five’ Conference Schools, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2014,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/ncaa-board-of-directors-approves-autonomy-for-big-5conference-schools/2014/08/07/807882b4-1e58-11e4-ab7b696c295ddfd1_story.html?utm_term=.e7eafbd71834; see also NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 16,
art. 5, 5.3.2.1.1, at 33 (granting the Power Five conferences the authority to adopt or amend legislation
autonomously).
21. ESPN.com News Services, Michigan Wolverines Coach Jim Harbaugh’s Salary Tops List of College
Football Coaches, ESPN (Oct. 26, 2016), http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/17892134/michigan-wolverines-coach-jim-harbaugh-salary-tops-list-college-football-coaches. The lowest was the ACC at a
median salary of $2,562,485. Id. The SEC, Big 12, Pac-12, and the Big Ten had median football coach
salaries of $4,172,500; $3,540,788; $3,102,960; and $2,753,100, respectively. Id.
22. Erik Brady et al., Major College ADs Averaging More Than $500,000 in Pay, USA TODAY, Mar. 6,
2013,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/03/06/college-athletics-directors-salaries-increase/1964239/.
23. In a 2015 investigation of the system of college athletics, The Chronicle of Higher Education stated,
“All those big television contracts might make you believe that college sports pour money back into campus,
or are at least self-sufficient [but] [n]othing could be further from the truth” and went on to note that public
universities had spent more than $10.3 billion in subsidizing their sport programs. Wolverton et al., supra
note 5. See Lesley Ryder, Don’t Pay College Athletes, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 18, 2011), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/lesley-ryder/pay-college-athletes-_b_968479.html (“The numbers from ESPN can be
deceiving. It’s true that big time sports like football and basketball can rake in millions of dollars in revenue,
but for most universities that money still isn’t enough to cover department costs.”).
24. Composition and Sport Sponsorship of the NCAA Membership, NCAA (Sept. 2018),
http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership/composition-and-sport-sponsorship-ncaa-membership.
25. FULKS, supra note 7, at 12.
26. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 12.
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and football are nearly as likely to generate less revenue than costs, even in
Division I-FBS.”28 The majority of the NCAA membership cannot cover the
costs of their athletic programs.29 As one President of a major university puts
it, “I’m amazed that intelligent people really believe that athletics makes a lot
of money for the university.”30 How then, are student-athletes to be paid? If
they are to be paid, which ones? Will men receive more than women?
The reality of the situation is that collegiate athletics is an expensive
endeavor that can lead to a large tab to be picked up by the school, and in many
cases by the unknowing general student body.31 In 2014, Rutgers athletics
operated at a deficit of $28 million.32 The school subsidized $18.5 million of
the deficit while the student-body subsidized the remaining $9.5 million by way
of student fees.33 A reported ninety percent of Division I schools similarly rely
on school subsidies.34 Paying student-athletes will result in the costs of
collegiate athletics to be exacerbated, leading to larger bills to be footed by the
general student body in increased tuition fees.35 Moreover, budget constraints
have forced some schools to drop athletic teams altogether. In 2013, Temple
University announced it would drop seven teams to save money.36 More
recently, the University of New Mexico announced a reduction in their athletics
budget and specifically included the line item “reduction in sports” in the plan.37

28. Defendants’ Opening Statement at 20, In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-In-Aid
Cap Antitrust Litig. (Alston), No. 4:14-md-02541-CW, 2017 BL 437266 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2018).
29. See Nathan Boninger, Antitrust and the NCAA: Sexual Equality in Collegiate Athletics as a
Procompetitive Justification for NCAA Compensation Restrictions, 65 UCLA L. REV. 754, 802 (2018)
(“[A]ltough football and men’s basketball may be profitable, additional funds from the university are still
generally needed to support athletic departments.”).
30. KNIGHT COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, supra note 2, at 48.
31. For example, a 2010 survey revealed that 54% of students at Ohio University were unaware that they
were each paying several hundred dollars in general fees to support the athletic department. Matt Krupnick,
Would Your Tuition Bills Go Up if College Athletes Got Paid?, TIME: MONEY, Nov. 28, 2014,
http://time.com/money/3605591/college-athletes-sports-costs-students/. See Boninger, supra note 29, at 802
(“Athletic departments often receive funds from the school, such as student fees allocated to athletics and
direct transfers from the general fund of the institution.”).
32. Steve Berkowitz et al., Most NCAA Division I Athletic Departments Take Subsidies, USA TODAY,
July 1, 2013, https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/05/07/ncaa-finances-subsidies/2142443/.
33. Id.
34. Phil Mushnick, Colleges Cutting Sports for ‘Revenue’ Doesn’t Add Up At All, N.Y. POST, Dec. 28,
2013, http://nypost.com/2013/12/28/colleges-cutting-sports-for-revenue-doesnt-add-up-at-all/.
35. Dorfman, supra note 17 (“Given that the colleges that lose money on athletics [] subsidize their
programs with money from regular student tuition, increasing pay to student athletes could mean tuition increases at many colleges.”).
36. Id.
37. Geoff Grammer, UNM Regents Approve Athletics Budget Calling for ‘Reduction in Sports’,
ALBUQUERQUE J., Apr. 17, 2018, https://www.abqjournal.com/1160076/unm-board-of-regents-approve-
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University of New Mexico’s reduction is being made to, in part, repay the $4.7
million that was borrowed from the main campus.38 One of the teams expected
to be cut is men’s soccer, which has played in two Final Fours, a national
championship, and has been a conference champion seven times since 2001.39
The University of California at Berkeley Athletic Department finished the 2017
fiscal year with a $16 million deficit and speculation that the University may
need a century to pay off their $440 million in debt despite the main campus
agreeing to assume more than half of that debt—$9.5 million in annual debt
service payments.40 Temple University and University of New Mexico are two
examples, of many, where schools that are already under tight budgetary
constraints have stopped providing opportunities to deserving student-athletes
to limit costs.41 UC Berkeley may be the next to join that group.
The funds generated from the revenue generating sports of men’s basketball
and FBS football are partially used to subsidize all other sports.42 And, because
the non-revenue generating sports are reliant on football and basketball
revenues, it is typically those non-revenue generating sports that get cut when
football and basketball are not as lucrative.43 Increased costs, such as those
resulting from student-athlete compensation, will inevitably lead to more of

athletics-budget-plan-calling-for-reduction-in-sports.html?utm_source=amp&utm_medium=more%20link&utm_campaign=amp.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Justice Delos Santos, UC Berkeley to Pay $238M of Cal Athletics Debt from Stadium Renovations,
DAILY CALIFORNIAN (Jan. 18, 2018), http://www.dailycal.org/2018/01/17/central-campus-take-chunk-calathletics-debt/.
41. Liz Clarke, Maryland Athletics’ Financial Woes Reveal a Broken College Sports Revenue Model,
WASH. POST, June 28, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/maryland-athletics-financialwoes-reveal-a-broken-college-sports-revenuemodel/2012/06/28/gJQAmEvx9V_story.html?utm_term=.8a4c154c5d2d (noting that 205 NCAA Division I
teams have been dropped over a five-year period due to athletic department budgetary constraints).
42. Wladimir Andreff, Sport and Financing, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF SPORT 271, 281
(Edward Elgar 2006). It has been this way for a while. In 1994, former athletics director at the University of
Mississippi, Warner Alford, commented on the issue: “[I]t’s tough to get new women’s sports fully funded
when only football and men’s basketball bring in revenue.” NCAA, Former AD: Funding the Biggest
Stressor, NCAA, Sep. 19, 1994, at 1, available at https://ia801400.us.archive.org/31/items/NCAA-News19940919/NCAA-News-19940919.pdf).
43. See Ken Belson, With Revenue Down, Colleges Cut Teams Along with Budgets, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/04/sports/04colleges.html (likening football and basketball to
“sacred cows” and implying they will not be cut because of their ability to generate revenue, among other
things); see also Wolverton et al., supra note 5 (mentioning that subsidies make thousands of athletic
scholarships possible, without which would cause “many nonrevenue sports like track and field and swimming
[to be] cut.”).
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these cuts.44 The current president of the NCAA, Mark Emmert, recently noted
this very sentiment:
If you were going to move into a model where you were just
paying football and basketball athletes . . . the way athletic
departments are going to do that is they are going to eliminate
other sports. There is really no other way for them to do it. If
you just look at the revenue from football you might be able to
figure out how to pay football players but you would eliminate
all the other sports that are out there in order to do that and take
away opportunities from men and women.45
Critics argue that the NCAA leads a cartel of colleges and universities that
collectively underpays its primary labor force in revenue generating sports.46
As this Comment will argue, it is somewhat misleading to call the NCAA a
“cartel.”47 Team sports leagues of any kind must introduce restraints if they are
to operate effectively.48 For example, participants must agree to be bound by
rules and submit themselves to disciplinary procedures; teams must agree to a
system for scheduling games and determining a champion; and, in some cases,
44. Indeed, nearly half of all FBS Presidents have expressed concern that the current status of
intercollegiate athletics will affect the number of varsity sports their institution can retain in the future. See
KNIGHT COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, supra note 2, at 24; see also Bob Wuornos, The
Future of ‘Other’ College Sports, NAT’L REV., Jan. 17, 2015, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/411740/future-other-college-sports-bob-wuornos (explaining that “anyone who understands the systemic
dynamics of [Division I] sports knows that [student-athlete compensation] will inevitably create a competitive
crisis. . . . [A]thletic directors will be pressed to make up the difference by cutting the teams that big-money
sports once subsidized.”); Dorfman, supra note 17 (“Adding direct pay will put financial pressure on schools
to drop non-revenue sports.”); Jon Solomon, If Football, Men’s Basketball Players Get Paid, What About
Women?, CBS SPORTS (June 5, 2014), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/if-football-mensbasketball-players-get-paid-what-about-women/ (noting NCAA conference commissioners, university
presidents, and athletic directors whom have suggested that paying players could result in women’s sports
and non-revenue men’s sports being cut).
45. NCAA
(@NCAA),
TWITTER
(Mar.
31,
2018,
9:48
AM),
ter.com/NCAA/status/980124563353886720 (statement by NCAA President, Mark Emmert).

https://twit-

46. See Karl W. Einolf, The Economics of Collegiate Athletics, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF
SPORT 379 (Edward Elgar 2006); see also Sandy, supra note 12, at 390 (“The NCAA has been described as a
surplus-maximising cartel run primarily for the financial benefit of a small coterie of senior NCAA
employees, former employees, and prominent athletic directors and coaches.”).
47. ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME
COLLEGE SPORTS 6 (1999) (“[B]ig-time college sports is organized as a cartel . . . through the NCAA”);
Andres Rodriguez Brauer, The NCAA Cartel, ECON. REV. at NYU (Apr. 19, 2017), https://theeconreview.com/2017/04/19/the-ncaa-cartel/ (describing the NCAA as an “exploitive cartel”).
48. Stefan Szymanski, The Sporting Exception and the Legality of Restraints in the US, in HANDBOOK
ON THE ECONOMICS OF SPORT 730, 730 (Edward Elgar 2006) (discussing the sports leagues as a joint venture,

which may in all likelihood require the agreement of restraints among the members). See Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984) (noting that some restraints “must be agreed upon”
if competition is to continue to effectively exist amongst the NCAA’s member institutions).
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agreements must be made to restrain unbridled competition because it can lead
to an environment that lacks competitive balance—where a few teams dominate
all others—which is bad for business of sport.49 The NCAA’s compensation
restrictions are one example of a restraint that is made to mitigate the possibility
of monopolies. Compensation restraints in sport have been around since before
the NCAA came into existence. Indeed, Major League Baseball began
instituting a compensation restraint—known as the reserve clause—in 1879.50
The Supreme Court has refused to overturn the reserve clause.51
Nonetheless, critics—including some student-athletes themselves—are
bringing their claims to be heard in a court of law. Broadly speaking, the claims
allege that various NCAA rules constitute an unreasonable restraint on trade,
which violates federal antitrust law. Recently, in O’Bannon v. National
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, several current and former men’s basketball and
football student-athletes (the “Plaintiffs”) made this very claim.52 Specifically,
the Plaintiffs alleged that NCAA rules barring student-athletes from being paid
for their names, images, and likenesses (“NILs”) constitute as a violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.53 Initially, the Plaintiffs were successful. The
district court applied antitrust analysis54 and concluded that the NCAA was
indeed in violation of federal antitrust law and, while the NCAA could cap the
amount of compensation men’s basketball and football student-athletes receive,

49. Szymanski, supra note 48.
50. Id. at 731. The reserve clause tied a player to the one specific team that held that player’s contract the
previous season. Lawrence Hadley, The Reserve Clause in Major League Baseball, in HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF SPORT 619 (Edward Elgar 2006). If a player wanted to play Major League Baseball, he could
only play for the one team that held his contract, unless he was traded at the owner’s discretion. Id. Although
it is not facially a compensation restriction, the reserve clause has the same effect by reducing player wages
due to an elimination of competition on the owners’ side of the labor market. Id.
51. The reserve clause was tested in 1922 and again in 1972. In the first case, the Supreme Court decided
that antitrust laws do not apply to baseball because it does not involve interstate trade. Federal Baseball Club
v. Nat’l League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). In the second case, the reserve clause was again left untouched; instead
leaving the rule to Congress to overturn. Flood v. Kuhn, 107 U.S. 258 (1972). The clause was eventually
overturned by a private arbitrator. David Greenberg, Why Does Baseball Have An Antitrust Exemption?,
SLATE (July 19, 2002), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2002/07/why-does-baseball-have-an-antitrust-exemption.html. But see Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (affirming the finding
that the NFL Draft serves as a compensation restriction and is thus a violation of Sherman antitrust law);
Robertson v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 890-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (noting that many NBA
compensation-related rules appear to be per se violative of the Sherman Act).
52. 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
53. Id. at 963. As will be addressed later in this Comment, Plaintiffs also alleged that limiting
scholarships to Grant-in-Aid, as opposed to the full cost of attendance, is violative of federal antitrust law.
Id. at 982-93.
54. The analysis applied, known as the Rule of Reason, will be thoroughly discussed later in this
Comment.
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it could not set the cap below the cost of attendance.55 Significantly, the court
also held that the NCAA membership must permit cash payments—not to be
capped at less than $5,000—into a trust for each year that the men’s basketball
and football student-athlete remained academically eligible, which was to be
payable when the student-athlete left the school or their eligibility expired.56
Under this holding, for the first time the student-athletes were entitled to
compensation specifically related to the added revenues they bring to their
institution.
With respect to the Plaintiffs’ compensation claim, their success was
short-lived. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, in part, the holding of the
lower court.57 The appellate court agreed that the NCAA was in violation of
federal antitrust law and that schools should be permitted to provide aid up to
the full cost of attendance.58 The court disagreed with the lower court’s decision
to allow compensation to be placed into a trust and distributed to
student-athletes upon graduation or expiration of eligibility.59 The court held
that allowing pure cash compensation fails to preserve amateurism, which is
founded on the idea that student-athletes compete as an avocation rather than as
professionals.60 Thus, compensation unrelated to educational expenses, such as
a trust fund drawn from licensing agreements, is not an available remedy.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari61 and the Plaintiffs ultimately walked
away with the opportunity to receive financial aid up to the cost of attendance,
but nothing more. I believe this was the right outcome. The courts have a long
history of recognizing amateurism as a justification for NCAA rules that restrict
compensation.62 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit did what the district court
55. Id. at 1008-09.
56. Id. at 1009.
57. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
58. Id. at 1072, 1075-6.
59. Or, if the student-athlete never graduates, it is upon expiration of the student-athletes’ eligibility. Id.
at 1079.
60. Id. at 1078.
61. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
277 (2016).
62. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984) (“It is reasonable to
assume that most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA are justifiable means of fostering competition among
amateur athletic teams”) (emphasis added); Id. at 102 (“In order to preserve the character and quality of the
[college sports], athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like.”); see also Agnew v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 344-45 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The NCAA’s limitation on athlete
compensation . . . directly advances the goal of maintaining ‘a clear line of demarcation between
intercollegiate athletics and professional sports,’ and thus is . . . aimed at preserving the existence of
amateurism and the student-athlete”) (citations omitted) (quoting Banks v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
977 F.2d 1081, 1089 (7th Cir. 1992)); McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 845 F.2d 1338,
1344-45 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that amateur eligibility centered around amateurism allows the NCAA product
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should have done by recognizing the consistency of the courts’ jurisprudence
and holding that “cash sums untethered to educational expenses . . . is a quantum
leap” from the NCAA’s current amateurism preserving policy.63
Moreover, an argument originally made by the National Football League
(NFL) in Sullivan v. NFL would serve to justify the compensation restraints
equally as well if borrowed by the NCAA.64 In Sullivan, the NFL was sued for
antitrust violations due to a policy that restricted owners from offering to sell
public stock in an NFL team (the “Public Ownership Policy”).65 In response,
the NFL claimed that its Public Ownership Policy “enhanced [its] ability to
effectively produce and present a popular entertainment product unimpaired by
the conflicting interests that public ownership would cause.”66 Allowing
publicly owned teams, the NFL argued, would conflict with the long-term
interests of the league as a whole due to short-term dividend expectations of
public shareholders.67 The NFL argued that this justification should be
considered in the court’s antitrust analysis.68
The NFL’s argument was significant because traditional antitrust inquiries
involve restrictions, and the justifications for those restrictions, that reside in the
same relevant market. Here, the NFL argued that restrictions in the relevant
market of public ownership could be justified by the ancillary benefits to the
closely related market of “NFL football in competition with other forms of
entertainment.”69 The district court refused to recognize the NFL’s justification,
stating “a jury cannot be asked to compare what are essentially apples and
oranges.”70 On appeal, the First Circuit disagreed, noting that antitrust analysis
“seems to contemplate the balancing of a wide variety of factors and
considerations, many of which are not necessarily comparable or correlative”71
and concluded that it is appropriate to consider those ancillary benefits in one

to remain distinct from its professional counterpart and reasonably furthers the NCAA goal of integrating
athletics with academics).
63. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1078 (9th Cir. 2015).
64. Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994).
65. Id. at 1096.
66. Id. at 1113.
67. Id. at 1102.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1112.
70. Id. at 1111.
71. Id. at 1112 (referring to Justice Brandeis’ famous formulation of the rule of reason (citing Bd. of
Trade v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
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market as a justification for restraints in another market so long those markets
are closely related.72
The Sullivan holding presents the NCAA with an opportunity to make the
colorable argument that its compensation restrictions in the plaintiffs’ markets
of men’s basketball and FBS football can be justified by the ancillary benefits
that these restrictions provide in the closely related markets of non-revenue
generating sports. Specifically, that benefit is maintaining equality of
educational access and opportunity so that student-athletes may enjoy the
benefits of a worthy higher education.73
Part II of this Comment discusses the history of the NCAA and provides the
framework for analysis of antitrust claims under the Sherman Act. Part III
examines past NCAA antitrust cases, the recent O’Bannon decision, and the
currently pending74 NCAA antitrust case.75 Part IV argues that the courts prior
decisions necessarily require a finding that amateurism justifies the NCAA’s
compensation restrictions. Part V contends that, even if the courts are
unpersuaded by the weight of their prior decisions, the NCAA can point to the
ancillary benefits of its compensation restrictions as justification. Finally, Part
VI applies the ancillary benefits argument to the NCAA’s current antitrust
litigation, Alston.76

72. Id. at 1113. Notably, the court in Sullivan cites to the seminal Bd. of Regents decision as “one of the
more extensive examples . . . where the Court considered the value of certain procompetitive effects that
existed outside of the relevant market in which the restraint operated.” Id. at 1111. See L.A. Memorial
Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1397 (directing the finder of fact to “balance the gain to interbrand
competition against the loss of intrabrand competition,” where the two types of competition operated in
different markets).
73. U.S. v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 678 (3d Cir. 1993) (“It is most desirable that schools achieve
equality of educational access and opportunity in order that more people enjoy the benefits of a worthy higher
education.”).
74. The decision is pending at the time of this writing. It is expected that the decision will be made by
the time this Comment is published. See Michael McCann, Alston v. NCAA: Analyzing College Sports’
Grant-in-Aid Trial, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 4, 2018, https://www.si.com/college-football/2018/09/04/alston-v-ncaa-trial-news-updates-ncaa-cost-attendance (nothing that a ruling on the current NCAA antitrust
litigation is likely to be made sometime in November 2018).
75. In re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig. (Alston), No. 4:14-md-02541-CW (N.D. Cal.
argued Sept. 25, 2018). For simplicity, the case’s colloquial name, Alston, will be used throughout this
Comment.
76. Id.
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II. HISTORY
A. Pre-NCAA Collegiate Sport
The first recorded intercollegiate athletic event occurred in 1852 when
Harvard and Yale organized a regatta.77 The event was commercially sponsored
and, to gain an edge over the Yale Bulldog competition, Harvard enlisted the
services of a non-student coxswain.78 Like so many of today’s collegiate
contests, the first intercollegiate athletic event “was characterized by
commercialization, crowds of spectators, prize money, and an eligibility
question.”79 Robert Evans, reflecting on the history of the intercollegiate sports,
states: “The problem of misrepresentation, illegal recruiting, and payment of
athletes isn’t a new one for big-time college athletics . . . . Gymnasium walls
have echoed with similar cries ever since the humble beginnings of college
sports.”80
By 1870, collegiate athletics had taken their place in American college
life.81 It was during this year that the first intercollegiate football game
occurred.82 Baseball was played in all of the prominent eastern colleges.83
Rowing, too, maintained its popularity after the Harvard-Yale regatta of 1852.84
The increased prevalence of intercollegiate competition came with an increased
desire to form associations that would allow teams to meet each other in athletic
competition on a uniform and accepted basis.85 To that end, the Intercollegiate
Football Association, Rowing Association of American Colleges, and
Intercollegiate Association of Amateur Athletes of America were all founded

77. Rodney K. Smith, The National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Death Penalty: How Educators
Punish Themselves and Others, 62 IND. L.J. 985, 988-90 (1987).
78. Id. at 989. Harvard won. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 7, at 18. See Sandy, supra note 12, at 396
(“At the beginning of intercollegiate athletics some colleges recruited athletes who had no connection with
the college, they simply wore the school’s jersey for pay.”).
79. Smith, supra note 77, at 989 (quoting GEORGE MASON UNIV. & AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC., ADMIN.
UNIV. PROGRAMS: INTERNAL CONTROL & EXCELLENCE 18 (1986)). These types of eligibility questions
would persist. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, a successful student-athlete at Yale was provided
with a suite of rooms in the dorm, free meals, a scholarship, the ability to sell programs for profit, was made
an agent of the American Tabaco Company, where he received a commission, and a ten-day paid vacation in
Cuba. Id. at 989 n.23.
80. ROBERT J. EVANS, BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORTS 7 (1974).
81. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 7, at 18.
82. The game was between Rutgers and Princeton, which was spurred by the loss of Rutgers to Princeton
in a baseball game. Id. at 19. Rutgers won. Id.
83. Id. at 20.
84. Id. at 19.
85. Id. at 21.
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during the 1870s.86 None of the associations were successful however, as
partisanship, rivalry, and inconsistency would prove to be their undoing.87
The 1880s saw collegiate athletic competition more fully assume the
commercial nature that continues to be present today, due in large part to the
influences of university alumni and the acquiescence of university faculty.88
Colleges began charging for admission to contests and soliciting financial
support from alumni.89 The increased funding allowed for coaches that were
more technical and were paid salaries.90 Salaried coaches led to intensified and
elaborated training for student-athletes.91 The reputation of a college came to
be predicated upon its victory count.92 Notions of loyalty, power, and social
prominence led to the continued generous contributions by alumni to college
athletic programs.93
The increasingly blatant commercialization of collegiate athletics did not
go unchallenged. Harvard President Eliot’s annual report from 1892-93, which
set forth the benefits and disadvantages of college athletics, provided the
groundwork for a bitter attack on the then-status of college athletics.94 The
annual report led to a broad controversy, with critics claiming that college
athletics is filled with dishonesty; betting and gambling; recruiting and
subsidizing; employment and payment of the wrong kind of men as coaches;
extravagant expenditures of money; and the general corruption of youth.95
Defenders of collegiate athletics (many being college graduates and former
players) were quick to point to the vigor and mental alertness of athletes; their
“manly character;” their loyalty; and the qualities of leadership that
participation in athletics had engendered.96 Defenders scoffed at the notion that
any college athlete could be paid.97
Disagreement regarding the merit, or lack thereof, in collegiate athletics
would continue. Agreement did exist, however, regarding the need for
centralized agencies that could handle the relationships between colleges and

86. Id. at 20.
87. Id. at 21.
88. Id. at 23.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 22.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 24.
93. Id. at 23.
94. Id. at 24.
95. Id. at 25.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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universities.98 Three organizations were founded during the last decade of the
nineteenth century in an effort to meet this need.99 Namely, these were the
Southern Intercollegiate Athletic Conference, the Intercollegiate Conference
(known today as the “Big Ten”), and the Maine Intercollegiate Track and Field
Association.100 These organizations paved the way for the first nationwide
attempt to unite in one body all the reputable colleges and universities
supporting intercollegiate competition—the NCAA.101
B. The NCAA
In 1905, alarmed by eighteen deaths and over one hundred injuries in
intercollegiate football, President Theodore Roosevelt invited officials from
major football programs to participate in a White House conference.102 The
conference was intended to reduce the unsavory violence and mayhem that
characterized collegiate football contests.103 Additionally, President Roosevelt
was concerned with the preservation of amateurism.104 The meeting ultimately
led to the formation of the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United
States, which was officially renamed the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) in 1910.105 The Association had sixty-two original
members and was organized specifically to eliminate that “unsavory violence”
and to “preserve amateurism.”106
The NCAA spent its first several years organizing and promoting
championship events,107 leaving the actual governance and running of

98. Id. at 26.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 27.
101. Id.
102. Smith, supra note 77, at 990. Violence in football was not uncommon. In the 1880’s, then-Harvard
President, Charles William Eliot, described football at “brutal” and formally abolished football for two years
in 1884. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 7, at 21-22. See Wray Vamplew, The Development of Team Sports
Before 1914, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF SPORT 435, 438 (Edward Elgar 2006) (“[American
Football] was a brutal but popular game with many injuries and deaths and in 1905, following a season in
which 18 college players had died, [the NCAA] was formed to overhaul the rules.”).
103. James V. Koch, The Economic Realities of Amateur Sports Organization, 61 IND. L.J. 9, 12 (1985).
104. Id.
105. Smith, supra note 77, at 991. In order to avoid confusion, the NCAA will be referred to as the
NCAA even when discussing the Association during the years of 1905 to 1910. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 963 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“The NCAA was founded in 1905 by the
presidents of sixty-two colleges and universities in order to create a uniform set of rules to regulate
intercollegiate football.”).
106. Smith, supra note 77, at 991; CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 7, at 27.
107. Smith, supra note 77, at 991.
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intercollegiate athletics in the hands of the students as it had always been.108 In
1929, the NCAA was forced to reconsider this structure due to a damning
three-year study by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Education
(the “Carnegie Report”):
[A] change of values is needed in a field that is sodden with the
commercial and the material and the vested interests that these
forces have created. Commercialism in college athletics must
be diminished and college sport must rise to a point where it is
esteemed primarily and sincerely for the opportunities it affords
to mature youth . . . to exercise at once the body and the mind
and to foster habits [of] both bodily health and . . . high
qualities of character . . . .109
In response, the NCAA restructured recruiting rules, and coaches and
administrators began to take a major role in operating and recruiting at each
athletic program.110
Scandals would continue to occur however,111 prompting the NCAA to
enact the Sanity Code in 1948, which was created to “alleviate the proliferation
of exploitive practices in the recruitment of student-athletes.”112 The Sanity
Code was short-lived,113 being replaced in 1951 with the Committee on
Infractions, an enforcement body with the authority to penalize members
involved in rules violations.

108. It was status quo for intercollegiate athletics to be governed and ran by the students. It had been that
way since the 1850s:
The rowing clubs had set a precedent for student-run organizations in the early days of
intercollegiate athletics, raising their own funds, purchasing equipment, and constructing
facilities. In the 1850s the boating organizations were initiated, coached, administered, and
financed by students. The captain was indispensable. He assured the continuance of the
organization, served as its coach and administrator, organized fund raisers, and promoted
his club; he was the sole arbiter of the athletic program, although the team managers
controlled the scheduling of contests and the purse strings.
Smith, supra note 77, at 989 n.21. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 7, at 21 (noting how management
of American college athletics appears to have been entirely in the hands of the students until the late nineteenth
century).
109. Smith, supra note 77, at 991 (alteration in original).
110. Id. at 992.
111. For instance, college athletics faced a major gambling scandal in 1945 when a team was caught
shaving points to keep the spread margin down. Ironically, the worst gambling scandal occurred after the
Sanity Code was introduced in 1948, when thirty players and seven schools were found to have conspired to
fix games in 1951. Smith, supra note 77, at 989 n.39.
112. Id. at 992.
113. The Sanity Code was ineffective because its only recourse was to expel members from the NCAA
in the event that a violation was uncovered. Id. at 993.
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Under the leadership of newly appointed Executive Director, Walter Byers,
the NCAA marked a new beginning.114 The power of the new Committee on
Infractions was complemented by a new enforcement division coupled with a
newfound financial power due to the successful negotiations of the first
collegiate football television contract, valued at over one million dollars.115 The
NCAA began to play a dominant role in the governance of intercollegiate
athletics for the first time.116 This dominance, however, came with competing
criticisms that persist today. One set of criticisms asserted that intercollegiate
athletics had been commercialized to the point that it was little more than a big
business masquerading as an educational enterprise.117 On the other hand, the
NCAA was criticized for having enforcement efforts that were too harsh on
some schools and not harsh enough on others.118 The NCAA attempted to abate
the criticisms with another round of major reform efforts to no avail.119
Legislators, too, were critical. The NCAA was the subject of a
congressional investigation into the alleged unfairness of its enforcement
procedures and processes in 1978.120 In response, the NCAA again amended its
procedures.121 Criticisms continued to grow and reached a fever pitch when an
investigation into the drug-related death of a student-athlete revealed a lack of
academic integrity at the University of Maryland.122 The revelation led to calls
for organized protests over abuses in athletic programs and demands that major
sports powers cut their athletic budgets.123
Determined to change course, the university presidents called a special
convention in June 1985.124 Like the NCAA, the university presidents

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. One of the major governance changes by the NCAA was establishing divisions within college
athletics in an effort to group institutions of similar sizes for the purpose of maintaining a similar level of
competitiveness. Id.
117. Id. at 994.
118. Criticism of the NCAA grew in force when, in 1976, the NCAA’s rule enforcement powers
expanded, allowing for schools to be directly penalized and administrators, coaches and student-athletes to be
indirectly penalized as well. Id.
119. In 1973, the NCAA formed a special committee to study the criticized enforcement process and
ultimately decided to separate the investigative and prosecutorial roles in the Committee on Infractions. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 995 (noting demands that were made by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching.
124. Smith, supra note 77, at 996. See Paul Hardin, Commission Unified on Proposals, NCAA NEWS,
June 19, 1985, at 2 https://ia902303.us.archive.org/30/items/NCAA-News-19850619/NCAA-News-
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themselves had been feeling competing pressures. On one hand, the university
faculty demanded that the presidents recognize their academic mission by
de-emphasizing major, “winning” athletic programs that were commercial in
both appearance and function.125 On the other hand, the university alumni,
boosters, board of trustee members, and state legislators pressured the
presidents to produce winning athletic programs.126 The presidents recognized
that if reform was to occur successfully, it needed to be on a national level, as a
collective unit.127 Competitive pressures of major athletics programs made it
impossible to implement major reform on individual campuses, where powerful
alumni, boosters, legislators and trustees used their positions to coerce
presidents to maintain a competitive edge as paramount, regardless of ethics.128
At the June 1985 special convention, the university presidents, through the
Presidents Commission, shifted control over intercollegiate athletics by
adopting key enforcement legislation in an effort to enhance academic integrity
in their athletic programs.129 The legislation effectively placed the Presidents
and Chancellors in control of the NCAA, replacing a regime of individual
accountability:
[The Presidents] are deeply concerned that there be sufficient
institutional control of athletics programs, [with] apparent lack
of such control in many instances leading to problems for
academic values in higher education. Presidents are heartsick
19850619.pdf. (comment by Drew University President Paul Hardin) (“Never before has the NCAA
convened . . . at the request of its presidents and never to deal with an agenda proposed by the presidents.”).
125. Smith, supra note 77, at 996.
126. Id. at 995. The alumni, boosters, board of trustee members, and state legislators were often
“power-brokers” that could provide important funds for the university, which could be used to build a science
building, for example. Walter Byers, Executive Director Assesses Status of Intercollegiate Athletics, NCAA
NEWS, Sept. 22, 1986, at 4, https://ia801402.us.archive.org/1/items/NCAA-News-19860922/NCAA-News19860922.pdf. University presidents were placed in the difficult position of having to direct these influential
individuals not to have a hand in the operations of the athletic program while also asking for large donations.
Id. Unprincipled head coaches would seek bypass the university president and deal directly with the
influential individual, creating pressure on the university president to comply. Id.
127. Smith, supra note 77, at 994.
128. Id. at 996-97 (describing the “association syndrome” and its ability to be used to promote values as
a collective unit, which could not be promoted in individually due to pressures of power university actors).
In support of major reform, then NCAA President Walter Byers described those pressures facing university
presidents:
It is difficult sometimes for a [president] who longs for funds to build a new science
building to offend one of those power-brokers by directing him not to have a hand in the
operations of the athletics program. And it is because of this leverage situation that the
popular, unprincipled head coach gets what he wants by dealing directly with the big-time
supporter, bypassing the university and athletics administration.
Byers, supra note 126.
129. Smith, supra note 77, at 997-98.
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about the serious violation of rules which are occurring by
coaches, alumni and other boosters and are determined to stop
them . . . . We can make it very clear by our actions here today
. . . that the nation’s presidents and chancellors are going to
determine the direction and the major policies of college
athletics, and that we are not going to condone any failure to
comply with those policies.130
This paradigm shift was timely. A few years prior to the special convention,
one coach told an NCAA representative, “While you’re out making new rules,
we the coaches are meeting at a hotel up the street trying to figure how to get
around them.”131
Once the legislation was adopted, the NCAA became a vehicle driven by
the universities as a collective unit. The fear that unilaterally adopting
legislation would result in a diminished capacity to compete was made less of
an issue because legislation would be adopted universally among the NCAA
member institutions.
Today, the corporate structure of the NCAA mirrors those significant
changes made by the President’s Commission in 1985. The highest governance
body in the NCAA, the Board of Governors, consists of twenty members,
sixteen of whom are Presidents or Chancellors of various large and small
colleges throughout the country.132 Those sixteen individuals are the only
members on the board who are entitled to vote on NCAA legislation, with the
exception that the President of the NCAA, currently Mark Emmert, may vote in
the case of a tie.133 Thus, the NCAA is simply a conduit by which the
universities regulate themselves—a central location where the university
presidents and chancellors can meet to discuss, and agree on, binding
legislation.134
130. Convention Success Spurs Future Commission Actions, NCAA NEWS, July 3, 1985, at 1, 10,
https://ia601400.us.archive.org/22/items/NCAA-News-19850703/NCAA-News-19850703.pdf (statement by
NCAA Presidents Commission Chair John W. Ryan). See Smith, supra note 77, at 997 (“[t]here is no doubt
who is running the show in college sports. It’s the college presidents.”) (quoting Associated Press
sportswriter, Doug Tucker).
131. J. WADE GILLEY ET AL., ADMINISTRATION OF UNIVERSITY ATHLETIC PROGRAMS: INTERNAL
CONTROL & EXCELLENCE 25 (1986).
132. NCAA, Board of Governors, http://web1.ncaa.org/committees/committees_roster.jsp?CommitteeName=EXEC (last visited Dec. 13, 2018).
133. Id.
134. Indeed, it has been accepted that the NCAA can be viewed as a body that “reflects the interests of
its member institutions, the colleges, and is directly controlled by college presidents.” Sandy, supra note 12,
at 390. The opposing view is that the NCAA is a “surplus-maximising cartel run primarily for the financial
benefit of a small coterie of senior NCAA employees, former employees, and prominent athletic directors and
coaches.” Id.

MCDAVIS COMMENT 29.1 (DO NOT DELETE)

294

12/2/18 2:29 AM

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:1

C. Amateurism
As mentioned in the prior section of this Comment, the NCAA was founded
in large part upon the idea of preserving amateurism. The Harvard-Yale regatta
of 1852 was significant not only in the fact that it institutionalized a tradition of
intercollegiate competition in this country—a tradition of utmost importance to
this very day—but also because it put on display the result when both
commercialization and competition are mixed: a win at all costs environment.135
President Roosevelt expressly acknowledged the issue of amateurism
preservation when he called the White House meetings that led to the formation
of the NCAA. The lack of a commonly held understanding of what it means to
be a student-athlete plagued intercollegiate competition in the years leading up
to the formation of the NCAA and continued to be problematic for decades
later.136 The need to establish boundaries around who could participate in
intercollegiate sport, and what their goals ought to be, had to be determined if
fair competition was ever to be achieved. It is through the concept of
amateurism that the NCAA seeks to set these boundaries. And, when one
considers the reports that a standard basketball player in the late 1970’s and 80’s
received $10,000—or that a top football player might receive $25,000—the
need for those boundaries of amateurism become critical.137 This section seeks
to review the NCAA’s approach toward amateurism and how that concept has
been received by critics.
Article VI of the NCAA’s original constitution was written to, in part,
prevent the participation by non-amateurs.138 A well-conceived definition of
amateurism remained elusive however, prompting the NCAA to establish a
committee to affirmatively define what an amateur is.139 The NCAA did just

135. GILLEY ET AL., supra note 131, at 17. Indeed, it has been acknowledged that commercialism in
collegiate athletics has led to widespread rule-breaking:
[I]t is too much to expect that human nature should not seek to evade detailed regulations,
especially when these regulations appear in certain cases to place a premium upon their
evasion. With the rise of commercialism in college athletics, its temptations became in
many instances too strong to be resisted. The result has been a great increase in the number
of ways by which, sometimes even under the guise of philanthropy, the amateur convention
is set at naught.
CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 7, at 50.
136. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 7.
137. GILLEY ET AL., supra note 131, at 32.
138. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 7, at 42.
139. Id.
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that, becoming the first—domestically or abroad140—to affirmatively define
what it means to be an amateur in 1909:
An amateur in athletics is one who enters and takes part in
athletic contests purely in obedience to the play impulses or for
the satisfaction of purely play motives and for the exercise,
training, and social pleasure derived. The natural or primary
attitude of mind in play determines amateurism.141
Importantly, the NCAA also defined what it means to be a professional
athlete, distinguishing the concepts of amateurism and professionalism:
A professional in athletics is one who enters or takes part in any
athletic contest from any other motive than the satisfaction of
pure play impulses, or for the exercise, training, or social
pleasures derived, or one who desires and secures from his skill
or who accepts of spectators, partisans, or other interests, any
material or economic advantage or reward.142
It is significant that the NCAA not only defines amateurism, but also
professionalism in athletics, with the primary distinction being the acceptance
of pecuniary gain.143 Taken together, the two definitions produce an important
takeaway: Amateurs don’t get paid.144
In 1916, the NCAA, along with various other organizations,145 established
a national standard of what it means to be an amateur: “An amateur athlete is
defined as one who participates in competitive physical sport only for the
pleasure, and the physical, mental, moral, and social benefits derived
therefrom.”146
Today, the NCAA maintains a definition of similar thrust, although worded
differently:

140. Id. at 42, 50 (noting that the NCAA was the first to affirmatively define amateurism in the United
States and that the conception of the amateur in international sport owes its definition to amateurism in the
United States).
141. Id. at 42 (“[The NCAA definitions] make up, so far as can be ascertained, the first attempt
affirmatively to define an amateur.”).
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. This distinction exists today. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 16, art. 12, 12.01.2, at 61
(“The student-athlete is considered an integral part of the student body, thus maintaining a clear line of
demarcation between college athletics and professional sports.”).
144. The Ninth Circuit relied on this concept expressly in the most recent antitrust litigation regarding
student-athlete pay. See generally O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir.
2015).
145. Namely the Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) and the Intercollegiate Association of Amateur Athletes
of America (IAAAA). CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 7, at 44.
146. Id.
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Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport,
and their participation should be motivated primarily by
education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be
derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an
avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from
exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.147
The concept of amateurism has thus been present since the NCAA’s
inception in 1906. The sincerity with which the NCAA actually observes and
enforces amateurism is subject to open debate. Critics claim that amateurism is
simply the veil behind which the NCAA hides as it profits off the backs of
student-athletes with unequal bargaining power.148 In some instances these
critiques seem warranted. For example, the NCAA allows student-athletes to
be paid by their respective countries for participation in the Olympics.149 In
2016, a gold, silver, or bronze metal resulted in a payout of twenty-five
thousand, fifteen thousand, or ten thousand dollars, respectively.150 And, where
the student-athletes earns multiple Olympic metals, those figures add up.151
147. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 16, art. 2, 2.9, at 4. The distinction of amateurism and
professionalism can be compared to that of the distinction between love and money. MARJORIE GARBER,
ACADEMIC INSTINCTS 5 (2001). Indeed, the word amateur is derived from the Latin word Amator, or lover.
Amateur, DICTIONARY, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/amateur (last visited Dec 13, 2018). The amateur
competes for the love of the sport alone, while the professional athlete competes for money. GARBER, supra.
148. Jason Whitlock, Greedy NCAA Still Exploiting Athletes, FOX SPORTS, Mar. 29, 2011,
https://www.foxsports.com/college-basketball/story/ncaa-amateur-concept-is-a-sham-that-exploits-players032911; Jay Bilas, Until the NCAA Solves the Money Problem and Pays Athletes Its Problems Will Continue,
ESPN (Sep. 28, 2017), http://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/20841877/until-ncaasolves-money-problem-pays-athletes-problems-continue; Patrick Hruby, Why America’s Newest Tennis
Sweetheart Should Sue the NCAA, VICE SPORTS (Aug. 28, 2014), https://sports.vice.com/en_us/article/nzpmjx/why-americas-newest-tennis-sweetheart-should-sue-the-ncaa
(“[E]veryone
knows
that
amateurism exploits the money-making young men on the field, the football players risking brain damage and
men’s basketball players . . . .”); Gerald S. Gurney & B. David Ridpath, Why the NCAA Continues to Work
Against Athletes’ Best Interests, CHRON. HIGHER. ED. (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Why-the-NCAA-Continues-to-Work/235522 (“The [NCAA] is made up of those presidents, athletic
directors, and conference representatives who approach college sports as a trade association to forward the
best interests of athletic administrators and coaches; the athletes are mere tools of athletic capital to achieve
those ends.”).
149. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 16, art. 12, 12.1.2.1.3.1.2 & 12.1.2.1.4.1.3, at 64-65
(Operation Gold Grant & Incentive Programs for International Athletes).
150. Steve Berkowitz, Olympics Offer Rare Chance for NCAA Athletes to be Paid, USA TODAY, Aug. 2,
2016, https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/olympics/rio-2016/2016/08/02/paying-ncaa-college-athletesat-rio-olympics-kyle-snyder-katie-ledecky/87709714/. In at least one case, a student-athlete competing for
his home country received about $740,000 for winning gold at the Olympics. Patrick Hruby, The NCAA Lets
College Olympians Collect Cash for Gold, Because Amateurism Is a Self-Serving Lie, VICE SPORTS (Aug. 18,
2016), https://sports.vice.com/en_us/article/8qyxmg/the-ncaa-lets-college-olympians-collect-cash-for-goldbecause-amateurism-is-a-self-serving-lie.
151. Katie Ledecky, Stanford University swimmer, took home $115,000 after earning six Olympic
medals in the 2016 Rio Olympics. Jackie Bamberger, Rio Mystery Solved: Can NCAA Athletes Keep Their
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Additionally, the NCAA allows tennis student-athletes the opportunity to accept
up to $10,000 per calendar year in prize money prior to their full-time collegiate
enrollment.152 A cursory review of these allowances make the hypocrisy of
amateurism seem clear and the criticisms warranted. Here, the NCAA allows
select student-athletes to be paid, an act directly contrary to the values it
contends are paramount. Without more inquisition, it is not entirely
unreasonable to conclude that amateurism is indeed a myth, used only to
advance the ends of the decisionmakers in the NCAA, rather than the
student-athletes.
But, in some cases, like those of the Olympic and tennis student-athletes
discussed above, an explanation does exist. In collegiate tennis, it has long been
accepted that the sport is dominated by international students.153 These
international students come from a different culture, one where “nobody plays
for free” and very few understand what amateurism is.154 Moreover, most lose
money despite having received prize checks due to travel and training costs.155
The NCAA specified the losses being absorbed by prospective student-athletes
and their families when the legislation allowing tennis student-athletes to earn
limited cash amounts was adopted.156 These foreign players are considered to
Olympic Medal Bonuses?, YAHOO! SPORTS (Aug. 12, 2016), https://sports.yahoo.com/news/rio-mysterysolved-can-ncaa-athletes-keep-their-olympic-medal-bonuses-032912550.html. Kyle Snyder, Ohio State
wrestler, retained his NCAA eligibility while taking home $250,000 in the 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympics.
See Adam Kilgore, College Athletes Can’t Be Paid for Their Performances – Unless They’re Olympians, CHI.
TRIB., Sep. 5, 2016, http://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/college/ct-college-athletes-olympics-paid20160905-story.html.
152. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 16, art. 12, 12.1.2.4.2 & 12.1.2.4.1, at 66 (Exception for
Prize Money Based on Performance—Sports Other than Tennis & Exception for Prize Money—Tennis).
153. In 2016, 41 nationalities were represented in 128 slots of the NCAA Division I tennis
championships. Chuck Culpepper, Why There’s No Time for Xenophobia in U.S. College Tennis:
They Need Internationals to Win, WASH. POST, May 30, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2017/05/30/why-xenophobia-has-been-beaten-out-of-u-s-college-tennis-theyneed-internationals-to-win/?utm_term=.f6ab62b54a9d. Ten years ago, there were thirty-eight nationalities
represented. Id. And, ten years before that, in 1998, forty-eight of the sixty-four male qualifiers were
international students. Id.
154. Hruby, supra note 148.
155. Id.; see also Joe Drape, Foreign Pros in College Tennis: On Top and Under Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 11, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/11/sports/tennis/foreign-pros-in-college-tennis-on-top-andunder-scrutiny.html (“Nobody makes a living at playing tennis in satellites and tournaments all over the
world.”) (quoting Virginia Commonwealth University Head Coach Paul Kostin).
156. Amateurism -- Exceptions to Amateurism Rule -- Prize Money Prior to Full-Time Collegiate
Enrollment -- Tennis -- $10,000 Per Year, NCAA DIVISION I AMATEURISM CABINET,
https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/reports/pdf/searchPdfView?id=2941&businessCode=PROPOSAL_SEARCH_VIEW&division (last visited Dec. 13, 2018).
Prospective student-athletes and their families spend exorbitant amounts of money for
travel and other expenses related to competing in tennis events . . . . Research by the United
States Tennis Association Player Development staff place the top junior and senior
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have upgraded the level of the college game157 and their presence within the
NCAA has grown substantially over the past decade.158 The facts suggest that
the NCAA is increasing opportunities for student-athletes. This seems even
more likely when it is taken into consideration that the NCAA generally loses
money through its facilitation of collegiate tennis.159
With regard to allowing payment for Olympic student-athletes, the motives
were similarly to help defray those significant costs that come with training for
competition on the world stage.160 Critics point to instances where NCAA
student-athletes received large payouts for their Olympic performances, with
one payout nearing one million dollars.161 But, like the coaches with
million-dollar annual salaries, these payouts are the exception rather than the
rule. The costs associated with training to be a world-class Olympic athlete,
worthy of medal recognition, are exorbitant—not to mention the equipment and
entrance costs.162 Most NCAA collegiate athletes participating in the Olympics
do not make money.163
However, there are some inconsistencies in the NCAA’s enforcement of
amateurism that are troublesome. The NCAA’s profits from the sale of

prospective student-athletes as having made significantly less than $10,000 per year in prize
money as prospective student athletes, and combined with the financial costs to their
families, most are not earning prize money in excess of their expenses.
Id.
157. As one coach puts it, “[y]ou cannot win a championship now . . . with all American players.”
Culpepper, supra note 153.
158. International student-athlete applicants to the NCAA multiplied twelve-fold between 2007 and 2017.
Pat Rooney, International Athletes Commuting in Droves to NCAA Athletics, BUFFZONE (Oct. 28, 2017),
http://www.buffzone.com/mensbasketball/ci_31410506/international-athletes-commuting-droves-ncaa-athletics.
159. In 2016, Men’s tennis teams had median losses of $683,000 and women’s tennis teams had median
losses of $726,000 at FBS institutions. DANIEL L. FULKS, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOC., NCAA
REVENUES AND EXPENSES OF DIVISION I INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS REPORT: FISCAL YEARS
2004 THROUGH 2016,
at
44
(2017),
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2017RES_D1RevExp_Entire_2017_Final_20180123.pdf.
160. “Such funds, even though based on place finish, generally are used to defer a significant amount of
expenses incurred by individuals who train to participate in such events.” Amateurism--Operation Gold
Grants, NCAA DIVISION I BOARD OF DIRECTORS, https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/reports/pdf/searchPdfView?id=505&businessCode=PROPOSAL_SEARCH_VIEW&division=1 (last visited Dec. 13, 2018).
161. The most commonly cited cases are those of student-athletes Katie Ledecky, Joseph Schooling, and
Kyle Snyder earning prize monies of $115,000, $740,000, and $250,000, respectively. Kilgore, supra note
151.
162. Natalie Finn, How Olympic Athletes Make Money If They’re Not Michael Phelps, Simone Biles or
Usain Bolt, ENEWS (Aug. 5, 2016), http://www.eonline.com/news/785451/how-olympic-athletes-makemoney-if-they-re-not-michael-phelps-simone-biles-or-usain-bolt.
163. Id.
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star-players’ jerseys164 and its failure to appropriately sanction high-revenue
generating schools165 are two of the most recent inconsistencies. In these cases,
proponents of the NCAA are hard-pressed to reconcile amateurism and the
practices of the NCAA. Harder questions arise: Should amateurism be
abandoned entirely? Or, alternatively, is it okay that amateurism has not been
distilled to its most perfect form? The courts, by way of the Sherman Antitrust
Act, have been forced to grapple with these questions. For decades, numerous
opinions on this issue have been drafted; and yet, a solution remains elusive.
The next section of this Comment outlines the courts’ current antitrust
framework—the mechanism by which the concept of amateurism has
historically been challenged. The rest of this Comment seeks to detail the most
relevant cases on this issue and, finally, considers a possible solution.
D. Antitrust Framework
The Sherman Antitrust Act is the primary authority under which claims are
brought against the NCAA for restricting student-athlete pay. Specifically,
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act makes it illegal to form any “contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States.”166 In order to prevail on a claim under
this Section, a plaintiff must show: (1) a contract, combination, or conspiracy;
(2) that the agreement unreasonably restrained trade; and (3) that the restraint
affected interstate commerce.167 When it comes to claims against the NCAA,
steps one and three of the analysis are low thresholds, which plaintiffs routinely
overcome.168 This is largely because the rules forbidding student-athletes from
receiving compensation are codified in the NCAA Manual, an embodiment of
the agreed upon rules, which satisfies part one of the analysis. As for step three,
the NCAA is a nationally operating enterprise, with member institutions

164. See Laken Litman & Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Apparel Sales Site Used Athletes’ Names in Search,
USA TODAY SPORTS, Aug. 7, 2013, https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2013/08/06/ncaa-shopsearch-football-jerseys-johnny-manziel/2625119/ (describing the NCAA’s practice of selling star players’
jerseys online with the name of player removed).
165. Marc Tracy, N.C.A.A.: North Carolina Will Not Be Punished for Academic Scandal, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 13, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/13/sports/unc-north-carolina-ncaa.html (discussing the
NCAA’s failure to punish the University of North Carolina for its academic fraud scheme).
166. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
167. Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1410 (9th Cir. 1991).
168. Indeed, the most prominent and contemporary case on the matter, O’Bannon, makes no discussion
of steps one and three of the antitrust analysis, preferring to discuss only the most contested piece of the
analysis, step two. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014); see
also In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
(making no discussion of parts one and two of the Sherman Antitrust analysis).
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operating in every state.169 Interstate commerce is clearly affected. Thus, claims
brought on this issue overwhelmingly turn on step two of a Sherman Antitrust
analysis: Did the agreement unreasonably restrain trade?
There are three available means with which the courts answer this question:
(1) the Rule of Reason; (2) the Per Se rule of illegality; or (3) the more recently
developed Quick Look analysis. Each are briefly discussed below.
1. Rule of Reason
Courts use the Rule of Reason to analyze antitrust claims brought against
the NCAA.170 Under the rule of reason analysis, an agreement unreasonably
restrains trade where “the relevant agreement likely harms competition by
increasing the ability or incentive profitability to raise price above or reduce
output, quality, service, or innovation below what likely would prevail in the
absence of the relevant agreement.”171 The courts utilize a three-step process of
burden shifting between the defendant-NCAA and the plaintiff to determine if
an agreement constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade.172
The plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the restraint produces
significant anticompetitive effects within a relevant market.173 A relevant
market consists of both a product and geographic market.174 The product market
includes the pool of goods or services that have reasonable interchangeability

169. The nationwide operations of the NCAA generated one billion dollars in revenue last year. See
DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION AND SUBSIDIARIES 26 (2017).
An argument that the NCAA does not affect interstate commerce would be futile.
170. In 1984, the Supreme Court determined that the NCAA should be subject to the rule of reason
analysis because it is a joint venture, which requires some self-imposed restraints if it is to exist at all. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984). The recent O’Bannon decision—at
both the district court and appellate court levels—cited this very case in its justification for applying the rule
of reason analysis. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2014);
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1063 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Am. Needle, Inc.
v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2010) (mandating the use of the rule of reason in cases of joint
ventures); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason Approaches to Antitrust
Analysis, 64. S. CAL. L. REV. 685, 697 (1991) (“[Justice Stevens applied rule of reason analysis] because
amateur collegiate athletics require certain horizontal restrictions on competitions (such as requirements for
academic credentials and the number of players on each team) in order for the product to be available at all.”)
171. FTC & DOJ, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 4 (2000).
Note, that the quoted language is accurate if somewhat awkward.
172. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1136 (N.D.
Cal. 2014)
173. Id.
174. Oltz v. St. Peter’s Cmty. Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1446 (9th Cir. 1988). Failure to identify a relevant
market is a proper ground for dismissing a Sherman Act claim. See Big Bear Lodging Ass’n v. Snow Summit,
Inc., 182 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 1999).
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of use and cross-elasticity of demand.175 The geographic market extends to the
area of effective competition where buyers can turn for alternate sources of
supply.176 Once the relevant market is determined, significant anticompetitive
effects in the relevant market must be established by the plaintiff. Significant
anticompetitive effects may be indirectly established by proving that the
defendant possessed the requisite market power within the relevant market.177
Alternatively, the anticompetitive effect may be established directly by showing
actual anticompetitive effects, such as control over output or price.178
If the plaintiff can satisfy this burden, the defendant must then come forward
with evidence of the restraint’s legitimate procompetitive justifications.179
Essentially, the defendant must show that, although they have imposed
restraints, those restraints are justified by some procompetitive effect, typically
in the same market.
If the defendant can demonstrate such a justification, the burden will shift
back to plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant’s justification can be
achieved by substantially less restrictive means.180 The less restrictive means
must be “virtually as effective” and must come “without significantly increased
cost.”181 If, at any point, a party is unable to meet their burden, they will lose.

175. Oltz, 861 F.2d at 1446. For example, in Law, the product market was defined as college basketball.
Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1018 (10th Cir. 1998).
176. Oltz, 861 F.2d at 1446.
177. Law, 134 F.3d at 1019.
178. Id.
179. In re Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1136 (N.D. Cal.
2014).
180. Id. Alternatively, if the defendant cannot meet its own obligation under the rule of reason
burden-shifting procedure, the court does not need to address the availability of less restrictive alternatives
for achieving a purported procompetitive goal. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW: ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION (3d ed. 2006).
181. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1074 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Cnty. of
Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001)). However, the test for less restrictive
means varies significantly depending on the court:
There is no uniformity in the application or even statement of the [less restrictive
alternative] test, either across or within the federal circuits. Instead, confusion and
inconsistency permeate the decisions. The two most significant variables in the test are the
level of requisite “restrictiveness” and the burden of persuasion. With respect to the burden
of persuasion, the majority of the circuits place the burden on the plaintiff to prove the
existence of a less restrictive alternative. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the District of
Columbia and the Seventh Circuit, however, place the burden on the defendant to prove the
absence of less restrictive alternatives, while the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh
and Second Circuits have been inconsistent, placing the burden on the defendant in one
case and the plaintiff in another. The level of restrictiveness varies from “least restrictive”
to “reasonable necessary.”
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2. Per Se
The Per Se analysis is appropriate where an entity is engaging in practices
that can be conclusively presumed illegal without any inquiry into competitive
purpose or market effect.182 Such practices exist where there is clearly a
pernicious effect on competition and the practice lacks any redeeming virtue.183
Courts have typically presumed practices such as price fixing,184 output
limitations,185 division of markets,186 and group boycotts187 as illegal, applying
the per se analysis accordingly. While some may find it appropriate that the
NCAA be subject to such an analysis, the Supreme Court has disagreed;
recognizing that the NCAA must make and enforce a myriad of rules defining
and sometimes restraining the manner in which institutions compete, if the
NCAA is to exist at all.188 Thus the per se analysis has yet to be applied to
antitrust claims against the NCAA.
3. Quick Look
Similar to the Per Se analysis, quick look is not typically applied to antitrust
claims against the NCAA.189 The quick look analysis is worth mentioning
because it has recently been argued that it is the appropriate lens with which the
court should view NCAA antitrust claims.190 The quick look analysis is a
truncated form of the rule of reason analysis and presumes the defendant’s
restraint is unlawful.191 Therefore, the burden does not start with the plaintiff to
demonstrate significant anticompetitive effects within a relevant market.
Gabriel A. Feldman, The Misuse of the Less Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in Rule of Reason Analysis,
58 AM. U. L. REV. 561, 583 (2009) (citations omitted).
182. Piraino, Jr., supra note 170, at 691. The per se analysis is applied where “the practice facially
appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.”
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979).
183. Piraino, Jr., supra note 170, at 691. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S.
85, 103-04 (1984) (“Per se rules are invoked when surrounding circumstances make the likelihood of
anticompetitive conduct so great as to render unjustified further examination of the challenged conduct.”).
184. U.S. v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 309-10 (1956).
185. U.S. v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608-09 (1972).
186. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49-50 (1990).
187. Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212-14 (1959).
188. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100-02.
189. Interestingly enough, the quick look analysis was developed and applied in the seminal Supreme
Court case involving the NCAA. See id. at 109 (noting that a relevant market analysis is not required by the
plaintiff where a naked restraint on price and output exists); see also Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998) (applying the quick look analysis).
190. In re Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1136 (N.D. Cal.
2014).
191. Id.
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Rather, it skips the initial rule of reason burden entirely, going straight the
defendant to justify the restraint. Like the rule of reason, if the restraint can be
justified, the burden will shift back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
plaintiff’s justification can be achieved by less restrictive means.
The quick look analysis is appropriate where “an observer with even a
rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements
in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”192
If any plausible justification for the restraint may exist, the quick look form of
analysis is inappropriate.193 The Supreme Court has found that the NCAA’s
general restrictions on student-athlete compensation could conceivably enhance
competition.194 Thus, like the per se analysis, the quick look analysis is
inappropriate in most antitrust cases challenging the NCAA’s amateurism rules.
III. ANTITRUST CLAIMS AND THE NCAA
A. History
More than three decades ago, in 1984, the Supreme Court decided National
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, a landmark decision that
dominates the NCAA’s now storied relationship with antitrust law.195
Proponents of NCAA amateurism rules argue that the fundamental premise of
the case is that student-athletes should not be paid.196 Unsurprisingly, it is this
case that the NCAA has relied on the most in defending its amateurism rules.
In Board of Regents, the University of Oklahoma and the University of
Georgia challenged an NCAA-mandated television plan that limited the amount

192. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
193. Id. at 771.
194. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1137 (N.D.
Cal. 2014) (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1984)).
195. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). See Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 339 (7th Cir.
2012) (referring to the Board of Regents decision as the “seminal case on the interaction between the NCAA
and the Sherman Act.”). Prior to the Board of Regents decision, very few antitrust claims had been asserted
against the NCAA. See Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or
Antitrust Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329, 337 (2007); see also Ben Strauss, 30-Year-Old Decision Could
Serve as Template for N.C.A.A. Antitrust Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/14/sports/ncaabasketball/30-year-old-decision-could-serve-as-template-for-ncaa-antitrust-case.html (“[The case] set[s] the rules of the game for the N.C.A.A. and how it should be examined as a
cartel.”).
196. Strauss, supra note 195 (“The fundamental premise of that case, as has been cited a number of times,
is that student-athletes should not be paid.”) (quoting NCAA Chief Legal Officer, Donald Remy). See Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984) (“In order to preserve the character and
quality of [college football], athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like.”).
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of times a member institution could appear on television.197 Restrictive
television plans had become routine for the NCAA.198 The NCAA adopted the
first one in 1951 after a year-long study revealed that television has “an adverse
effect on college football attendance and unless brought under some control
threatens to seriously harm the nation’s overall athletic and physical system.”199
Several member institutions, seeking to increase revenues, desired a more
liberal number of television appearances and, in 1979, sought to negotiate a
television agreement of their own.200 The NCAA publicly announced that it
would take disciplinary action against any member that entered into a separate
television agreement, effectively killing any chances of a separate agreement
coming to fruition.201 The Universities of Oklahoma and Georgia brought this
antitrust action in response.202
As discussed, the NCAA is subject to the Rule of Reason analysis for
antitrust claims. The plaintiffs met their initial burden of demonstrating
significant anticompetitive effects exist in a relevant market: The NCAA
television plan restricted each institution’s ability to sell television rights in the
relevant market of college football broadcasts.203 Consequently, the price for
those respective television rights were higher and the output was lower than they
might be in a less restrictive market.204 Thus, the anticompetitive effects were
“apparent.”205
The burden then shifted to the NCAA to justify the restraints imposed
through the television plan. The NCAA proffered three justifications,206 only
197. The agreement, negotiated by the NCAA, granted telecasting rights for all NCAA college football
games to the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) and the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) over a
four-year period. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 92-93 (1984). Under the
agreement, no single institution could appear on television more than a total of six times and not more than
four times nationally. Id. at 94. Additionally, the agreement set an absolute maximum on the number of
games that could be broadcast. Id.
198. The NFL had a similarly restrictive television plan, which allowed for the League to market
television rights collectively. SZYMANSKI, supra note 48. The NFL’s restrictive television plan was
overturned by antitrust legislation in 1953. U.S. v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953). Congress allowed
the television plan to survive however, by granting an antitrust exemption known as the Sports Broadcasting
Act of 1961. SZYMANSKI, supra note 48.
199. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 89 (1984) (citing the NCAA
Television Committee Report).
200. Id. at 94-95.
201. Id. at 95.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 105-07, 112-13 (1984).
204. Id. at 106-07.
205. Id. at 106.
206. The NCAA’s three justifications for the television plan were: (1) it enables the NCAA to better
compete against other forms of television entertainment by offering an attractive package sale; (2) it is
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one of which the court deemed to have salience: competitive balance amongst
amateur teams.207 The NCAA argued that its interest in maintaining competitive
balance amongst amateur teams is a legitimate procompetitive justification.208
Significantly, the Supreme Court agreed:
It is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA
are justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur athletic teams and
therefore procompetitive because they enhance public interest in intercollegiate
athletics.209
The NCAA next argued that its legitimate interest in maintaining that
competitive balance amongst amateur teams justified its restrictive television
plan.210 On this point, the Court disagreed. And, in the end, the Court
affirmatively acknowledged that the NCAA needs “ample latitude” in playing
the “critical role [of] the maintenance of a revered tradition of amateurism in
college sports.”211 But, a restrictive television plan is not a means of preserving
amateurism.212 The television plan does not “fit into the same mold” as those
rules that preserve amateurism.213 Thus, preserving amateurism is a legitimate
justification for which some restrictions will withstand antitrust scrutiny
because they enhance public interest in intercollegiate athletics. The Supreme
Court found that the television plan did not serve that legitimate purpose.214 The
restrictive television plan was a violation of antitrust law.215
The Board of Regents decision is important because it makes clear what the
critical role of the NCAA is: to preserve and maintain the revered tradition of
amateurism in college sports, which widens consumer choice216 and enhances
the public interest.217 And, “[t]here can be no question but that it needs ample

necessary to protect live attendance at college football games; and (3) it helps maintain competitive balance
among amateur athletics teams. Id. at 113, 116-17.
207. The first two justifications were given a cursory review before being invalidated. Id. at 115-17
(discussing the merits of the first two justifications for a few paragraphs before summarily dismissing them).
208. Id. at 117.
209. Id. See also General Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat’l Truck Leasing Ass’n, 744 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir.
1984) (“The essence of successful league competition is maintaining a balance of power among the
competitors—a goal antithetic to the goals of competition in a conventional economic market.”).
210. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117.
211. Id. at 120.
212. Id. at 117-18.
213. Id. at 117.
214. Id. at 119-20.
215. Id. at 120.
216. Id. at 102.
217. The Supreme Court notes that the NCAA widens the educational opportunities available to
student-athletes, which is procompetitive. Id. at 120. Case law demonstrates that increasing access to a higher
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latitude to play that role.”218 The Supreme Court is clear: “[T]he role of the
NCAA must be to preserve a tradition that might otherwise die.”219 Therefore,
Board of Regents should be read to mean the NCAA has ample latitude in
protecting amateurism, which may be done by imposing some restrictions, but
not all. The question then becomes: Is restricting student-athlete compensation
justified by protecting amateurism? Or, like the television plan, does restricting
student-athlete compensation not “fit into the same mold” as those rules that
preserve amateurism? Fortunately, the Supreme Court answers this question:
“In order to preserve the character and quality of [college sports], athletes must
not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like.”220 Arguably, Board
of Regents forecloses the question of whether the NCAA may restrict
student-athlete pay and the NCAA has been sure to argue as much.221
Several subsequent court decisions have doubled down on the Supreme
Court’s Board of Regents decision. In McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, several football players brought suit claiming the NCAA’s compensation
restrictions are a violation of antitrust law.222 The football players argued that
amateurism rules are not equally applied to all student-athletes, and thus the
rules stifle competition rather than encourage it.223 Relying almost exclusively
on the Board of Regents decision, the court found that the compensation
restrictions were reasonable and not in violation of federal antitrust law.224 The
court emphasized the Supreme Court’s Board of Regents language stating,
“athletes must not be paid.”225 Acknowledging the football players’ claims that
amateurism rules are not equally applied, the court said, “[t]hat the NCAA has

education is in the public interest and; thus, should be considered as a legitimate procompetitive justification.
U.S. v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 678 (3d Cir. 1993).
218. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 102 (emphasis added).
221. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 990 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1001
(N.D. Cal. 2013) (restating the NCAA’s contention that an antitrust claim brought against it challenging the
amateurism rules must be dismissed under the Board of Regents decision).
222. 845 F.2d 1338, 1342 (5th Cir. 1988).
223. The football players supported their claim with two allegations: (1) “the NCAA permits some
compensation through scholarships”; and (2) the NCAA “allows a student to be a professional in one sport
and an amateur in another.” McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 845 F.2d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir.
1988).
224. McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1344-45.
225. Id. at 1344 (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984)). See
Banks v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081, 1089 (7th Cir. 1992) (emphasizing the Supreme
Court’s language that student-athletes must not be paid) (citing Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102 (1984)).
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not distilled amateurism to its purest form does not mean its attempts to maintain
a mixture containing some amateur elements are unreasonable.”226
In Gaines v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, a football player challenged
NCAA amateurism rules that declared him ineligible after an unsuccessful bid
in the NFL Draft.227 Albeit in the context of a Section 2 Sherman antitrust
claim,228 the court once again cited the Board of Regents decision, finding the
NCAA’s restrictions as valid: “[A]thletes must not be paid” and “controls of the
NCAA . . . are justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur teams
and therefore procompetitive because they enhance public interest in
intercollegiate athletics.”229 Speaking specifically to the enhancement of the
public interest, the court added its own language: “The public interest is
promoted by preserving amateurism and protecting the educational objectives
of intercollegiate athletics.”230
Altogether, Board of Regents, McCormack, and Gaines can be understood
to stand for the proposition that, although amateurism has not been perfected, it
remains a legitimate justification for some restrictions, so long as those
restrictions further amateurism and educational objectives. In the decades since,
courts have nodded approvingly at the concept of amateurism and the pursuit of
educational objectives:
We should not permit the entry of professional athletes and
their agents into NCAA sports because the cold commercial
nature of professional sports would not only destroy the
amateur status of college athletics but more importantly would
interfere with the athletes proper focus on their educational

226. Id. at 1345.
227. 746 F. Supp. 738, 740 (M.D. Tenn. 1990). Commonly known as the “no-draft” rule, the NCAA
makes a player ineligible for participation in a particular intercollegiate sport when he or she asks to be placed
on the draft list or supplemental draft list of a professional league in that sport. Id. at 741.
228. A Section 2 Sherman antitrust claim, distinct from the Section 1 claims thus far discussed, alleges
that an illegal monopoly has been formed or attempted. “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.” Gaines v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 746 F. Supp. 738, n.4 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2).
229. Id. at 747. The court actually has two holdings. First, and most interestingly, the court holds that
some eligibility rules are not subject to antitrust review whatsoever. Id. at 745. Second, as discussed, the
court finds that, even if these rules are subject to antitrust review, the rules are “overwhelmingly
procompetitive” because they serve to “preserve the distinct ‘product’ of major college football as an amateur
sport.” Id. at 746 (emphasis added).
230. Id. at 747. “Moreover, [the no-draft rule] by the NCAA in fact makes a better ‘product’ available
by maintaining the educational underpinnings of college football and preserving the stability and integrity of
college football programs.” Id. at 746.
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pursuits and direct their attention to the quick buck in pro
sports.231
As recently as 2012, the Seventh Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s Board
of Regents decision directly to the question of whether student-athletes may be
compensated:
The NCAA’s limitation on athlete compensation beyond
educational expenses . . . directly advances the goal of
maintaining ‘a clear line of demarcation between
intercollegiate athletics and professional sports,’ and thus is
best categorized as an eligibility rule aimed at preserving the
existence of amateurism and the student-athlete.232
It seems that a colorable argument could be made that student-athlete
compensation restrictions are valid under the Sherman antitrust law. However,
the validity of amateurism, and therefore the legality of student-athlete
compensation restrictions, remains an open question—possibly more so than
ever before. This is because most court decisions that defend the concept of
amateurism and pursuing educational objectives as legitimate justifications for
various restraints have done so on the basis of the language stated in the
Supreme Court’s Board of Regents decision. Therefore, if the Board of Regents
language is challenged, so, too, is every other case upon which the NCAA may
rely to uphold its amateurism based restrictions. In 2014, the Northern District
Court of California did exactly this in its O’Bannon v. National Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n decision, finding the Supreme Court’s compelling amateurism
language as dicta.233 The next Section discusses the controversial O’Bannon
decision, and its partial reversal, in detail.
B. The Landmark Decision: O’Bannon
In O’Bannon, the lead plaintiff was Ed O’Bannon, a former collegiate
basketball player at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA).234 After
recognizing himself in a video game that he was not compensated for,
O’Bannon brought a class action antitrust suit against the NCAA for forbidding
231. Banks v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081, 1091 (7th Cir. 1992).
232. Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012). The court found that NCAA
bylaws eliminating the eligibility of players who receive cash payments beyond the costs of attending a
university “clearly protect[] amateurism.” Id. at 343.
233. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 990 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1001 (N.D.
Cal. 2013). See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1000-01 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
234. Steve Eder & Ben Strauss, Understanding Ed O’Bannon’s Suit Against the N.C.A.A., N.Y. TIMES,
June 9, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/10/sports/ncaabasketball/understanding-ed-obannons-suitagainst-the-ncaa.html.
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student-athletes from being compensated for the use of their names, images, and
likenesses (NILs) in broadcasts and videogames.235 More specifically,
O’Bannon alleged that the NCAA fixes the amount paid to student-athletes for
their NILs at zero and forecloses student-athletes from accessing the market for
their NILs.236 O’Bannon sought to prohibit the NCAA from enforcing
compensation restriction rules “that preclude FBS football players and Division
I men’s basketball players from receiving any compensation, beyond the value
of their athletics scholarships, for the use of their names, images, and likeness
in videogames, live game telecasts, re-broadcasts, and archival game
footage.”237 An O’Bannon win would have resulted in a major change to
collegiate athletics. In addition to current student-athletes being compensated,
it was expected that universities would be allowed to make financial offers to
high school recruits as a way to lure them to a given institution.238
Relying on Board of Regents, the NCAA moved to dismiss the claims made
by O’Bannon, arguing that the claims made are “nothing more than a challenge
to the NCAA’s rule on amateurism and therefore must be dismissed under
NCAA v. Board of Regents.”239 The court disagreed, refusing to accept the
proposition that the Board of Regents decision permits claims challenging

235. Id.
236. Third Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name &
Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C 09-01967 CW, 2013 WL 3810438, at 14, (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2013).
237. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2014). See Eder &
Strauss, supra note 234.
238. Eder & Strauss, supra note 234.
239. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 990 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1001 (N.D.
Cal. 2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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amateurism to be dismissed at the pleading stage.240 This claim would be
decided on the merits.241
The first and third steps of antitrust analysis require the plaintiff to show an
agreement was made that affects commerce among the several states. As
mentioned, this burden is routinely met by plaintiffs in antitrust suits against the
NCAA. The O’Bannon case is no different.242 Therefore, the subsequent
discussion—and most NCAA antitrust case law—focuses on the second step of
the antitrust analysis: the extent to which the agreement unreasonably restrains
trade.
1. Summary Judgment
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The NCAA’s motion was
denied in full and O’Bannon’s granted in part.243 The court applied the rule of
reason and plaintiffs met their initial burden by submitting factual evidence that

240. The court gives several reasons for refusing to grant the motion to dismiss the complaint. Chief
among them are: (1) the alleged harms to a competition and the justifications for those harms are intrinsically
factual, making them inappropriate to dismiss at the pleading stage; (2) the Bd. of Regents decision focused
on the restrictive television plan as opposed to restrictive eligibility rules and did not complete a factual
inquiry as to whether the compensation ban actually has a procompetitive effect; and (3) subsequent cases
have been able to state valid antitrust claims against the NCAA, similar to that of O’Bannon’s claim, and have
not been barred from doing so by the Bd. of Regents decision. Id. at 996, 1002, 1003, 1005 (citing Brennan
v. Concord EFS, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Paladin Associates, Inc. v. Montana
Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003); Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (9th Cir. 1984); Rock
v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 2013 WL 4479815, at *14 (S.D. Ind. 2013); White v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, Case No. 06-999, Docket No. 72, slip op. at 3 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 347 (7th Cir. 2012)); In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F.
Supp. 2d 1144, 1149 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (“[T]he NCAA is not exempt from the scrutiny under the Sherman
Act.”). See also Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 902 F. Supp. 1394, 1404 (D. Kan. 1995) (“[T]he
Court does not believe that the Supreme Court intended to give the NCAA carte blanche in imposing restraints
of trade on its member institutions or other parties because of its role in the marketplace.”), aff’d, 134 F.3d
1010 (10th Cir. 1998).
241. Prior case law suggests that a complaint may be dismissed under the Board of Regents holding only
when the restraint is obviously reasonable. Metropolitan Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 339 F. Supp. 2d 545, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[T]he challenged rules and expansions are not so
obviously reasonable as to fall into the group of restrictions sanctioned by Board of Regents.”).
242. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“The NCAA
does not dispute that these [challenged compensation restrictions] were enacted and are enforced pursuant to
an agreement among its Division I member schools and conferences. Nor does it dispute that these rules
affect interstate commerce. Accordingly, the only remaining question here is whether the challenged rules
restrain trade unreasonably.”).
243. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1126 (N.D. Cal.
2014).
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allowed for the plausible inference that the NCAA student-athlete compensation
restriction undermines free competition.244
The burden then shifted to the NCAA to identify any procompetitive
justifications for its restrictions on student-athlete compensation. The NCAA
proffered five such justifications: (1) preservation of amateurism in college
sports; (2) promoting competitive balance among Division I teams;
(3) integration of education and athletics; (4) increased support for women’s
sports and less prominent men’s sports; and (5) greater output in Division I
football and basketball.245 With the exception of the fourth justification—
increased support for women’s sports and less prominent men’s sports—the
NCAA met its burden to survive summary judgment.246
The court found against the NCAA on the fourth justification for three
reasons. First, the court noted that restrictions in one market may not be
justified by benefits in another.247 Thus, restrictions in the college education
market for football and basketball recruits cannot be justified by benefits
received in the markets of women’s sports or less prominent men’s sports.248
Second, the court stated that social welfare benefits cannot justify
anticompetitive restrictions; it is irrelevant that supporting women’s sports and
less prominent men’s sports serves a broader social purpose.249 Finally, the
court concluded that the NCAA can support these other sports through less
restrictive means, such as mandating a greater portion of revenues be directed
to those less prominent sports.250 The court concluded the compensation
restraint was not justified by increasing support to other sports and, accordingly,
the NCAA was prohibited from relying on the justification at trial.251
2. Trial Verdict
At trial, the plaintiffs again met their initial burden in the rule of reason
analysis—establishing that the NCAA created significant anticompetitive
effects in the college education market.252 Therefore, the NCAA was tasked

244. Id. at 1137. Recall that, under the rule of reason analysis, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of
showing that the challenged restraint produces significant anticompetitive effects within a relevant market.
245. Id. at 1146.
246. Id. at 1155.
247. Id. at 1151 (citing Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1112 (1st Cir. 1994)).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1150-51 (citing FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1990)).
250. Id. at 1151-52.
251. Id. at 1155.
252. Recall that the Plaintiffs survived summary judgment by establishing an inference that the NCAA
restrained competition in the college education and group licensing markets. Id. at 1138. At trial, Plaintiffs

MCDAVIS COMMENT 29.1 (DO NOT DELETE)

312

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

12/2/18 2:29 AM

[Vol. 29:1

with justifying the compensation restrictions. The NCAA relied on the four
procompetitive justifications that survived summary judgement to meet its
burden.253
First, and most importantly, the NCAA argued that its compensation
restrictions promote consumer demand by preserving its tradition of amateurism
and the identity of college sports.254 The NCAA again relied on the Board of
Regents holding to support this justification.255 The court was not swayed. The
court found that the Board of Regents language stating that student-athletes
“must not be paid,”256 did not serve to resolve any disputed issues of law in the
1984 case and was not based on any factual findings.257 Additionally, the court
found the Board of Regents decision less persuasive because it was decided so
long ago.258 The court concluded that the Supreme Court’s language was an
“incidental phrase”259 that does not establish compensation restrictions as
procompetitive.260 Accordingly, the NCAA’s reliance on the Board of Regents
language was unavailing.261
The NCAA also supported its amateurism justification by reasoning that
college sports’ amateur tradition and identity makes it distinguishable from
professional sports and other forms of entertainment, enhancing its popularity
with consumers.262 The court was not so convinced, questioning whether
amateurism is a tradition at all.263 The court pointed out that the NCAA has
revised its rules governing student-athlete compensation numerous times over

were unable to show that actual injury to competition in the group licensing market had occurred due to the
NCAA’s compensation restriction. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 996-98
(N.D. Cal. 2014). Thus, the scope of the antitrust claim was narrowed to the damage caused by the NCAA’s
compensation restriction to the college education market. Id. at 988, 993.
253. Those four are: (1) preservation of amateurism; (2) competitive balance; (3) integration of academics
and athletics; and (4) increased output. Id. at 999.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984)).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 1000. Calling the Supreme Court’s language an “incidental phrase” may have been a strategic
decision by the district court. The court could have deemed the language to be dicta. However, even Supreme
Court dicta requires some deference. See United States v. Augustine, 712 F.3d 1290, 1295 (9th Cir. 2013)
(“We do not treat considered dicta from the Supreme Court lightly”). Here, the court avoids that problem.
260. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
261. Id. at 999.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1000 (“The historical record that the NCAA cites as evidence of its longstanding commitment
to amateurism is unpersuasive.”).
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the years, sometimes in contradictory ways.264 Noting that current rules allow
only tennis players to receive compensation before starting college, the court
concluded that amateurism has been “malleable” since its founding and that
failure to adhere to a single definition is not indicative of core principles.265 The
NCAA also introduced a consumer survey to demonstrate that amateurism does,
in fact, increase consumer interest, and is therefore procompetitive.266 The court
was unpersuaded by the survey’s finding that respondents across the United
States “generally oppose[] the idea of paying college football and basketball
players.”267 According to the court, the survey did not appropriately address
“how consumers would actually behave if NCAA’s restrictions on
student-athlete compensation were lifted.”268 Per the plaintiff’s argument, the
court found that compensation restrictions have limited bearing on a sport’s
popularity.269 To support this point, the court noted Major League Baseball’s
elevated popularity and increased revenues after it removed restrictions on its
players’ compensation levels in the face of overwhelming public opposition.270
Ultimately, the court determined that amateurism is “not the driving force
behind consumer interest” after considering lay witness testimony suggesting
that interest is derived from other sources, such as loyalty.271 Unlike the Board
of Regents, McCormack, and Gaines decisions, the court here would not observe
that “ample latitude”272 previously afforded to the NCAA. Rather, the court
determined that Board of Regents and its progeny are only applicable where the
264. Id. Specifically, the court noted that the original rules banned the awarding of scholarships to
individuals based on athletic ability. Id. at 973-75. The court went on to note the general introduction of
athletic scholarships in 1956; the allowance for tennis recruits to earn up to ten thousand dollars in prize
money before they enroll in college; and permitting student-athletes to receive federal need-based monies
beyond the NCAA’s stated maximum allowed. Id. at 974-75 (“This conception of amateurism stands in stark
contrast to the definitions set forth in the NCAA’s early bylaws.”).
265. Id. at 1000.
266. Id. at 975.
267. Id.
268. Id. The survey does ask consumers if they were more or less likely to observe a college football or
basketball game based on certain specified levels of pay to the student-athletes. Id. The results demonstrated
that as the pay per student-athlete increased, the respondents were less likely to observe the sporting event.
Id. (emphasis added). This result, coupled with the finding that consumers across the country generally
oppose paying football and basketball student-athletes, arguably allows for the reasonable inference that
consumers find collegiate sport appealing because of its amateur character.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 977-78 (emphasis added). Namely, loyalty to the school, which is shared by both alumni and
people who live in the region or the conference. Id.
272. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 121 (1984). Notably however, the
court makes no distinction between a rule change allowing already-pro MLB players to be paid more, and one
allowing amateur student-athletes to be compensated for the first time ever—arguably two very different
concepts.
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challenged restraint “actually play[s] a substantial role in maximizing consumer
demand for the NCAA’s products.”273 Thus, because amateurism is “not the
driving force behind consumer demand,”274 it “might justify certain limited
restraints”275 but does “not justify the [compensation restrictions].”276
Second, the NCAA asserted that its compensation restrictions are
procompetitive because they maintain the current level of competitive balance
among football and basketball teams, which is needed to sustain consumer
demand.277 The court found that the NCAA simply did not have enough
evidence to support that proposition.278 In fact, the court found there was
“academic consensus” to the opposite—NCAA amateurism rules “have no
discernable effect on the level of competitive balance.”279 The court was also
troubled by NCAA policies that seem to hinder competitive balance.
Specifically, the court was troubled by the universities’ ability to spend freely
on football coaching salaries and the NCAA’s redistributing of revenues to
schools that perform well in the Division I men’s basketball tournament.280 The
court reasoned that these policies cancel out the leveling effect that
student-athlete compensation restrictions might have on competitive balance
and generally benefit the highest revenue generating schools more than
others.281
Third, the NCAA contended that its compensation restrictions promote the
integration of academics and athletics by ensuring that student-athletes obtain
all available educational benefits while participating in their schools’ academic
communities.282 The court found that NCAA rules unrelated to student-athlete
compensation—like those prohibiting athlete-only dorms and limits on practice
time—are better suited to achieve the integration of academics and athletics.283
The court acknowledged testimony of university administrators asserting that

273. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1000 (emphasis added).
274. Id. at 977-78.
275. The court gives insight as to what those “certain limited restraints” might be: “[T]hey might justify
a restriction on large payments to student-athletes while in school.” Id. at 978, 1001.
276. Id. at 978.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 979 (“Given the lack of such evidence in the record, the Court finds that the NCAA’s
challenged rules are not needed to achieve a level of competitive balance necessary, or even likely, to maintain
current levels of consumer demand for FBS football and Division I Basketball.”).
279. Id. at 978 (quoting testimony from Dr. Noll; a study done by economist Jim Peach; and another
finding by Dr. Rascher).
280. Id. at 978-79.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 979, 1002.
283. Id. at 980.
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student-athletes could make more money than their professors, or be inclined to
separate themselves from the broader campus community, if they are to be paid
large sums of money.284 But, ultimately the court concluded that, even though
“certain limited restrictions on student-athlete compensation may help” to
integrate academics and athletics, the NCAA may not use this goal to justify a
sweeping prohibition on any student-athlete compensation.285
Finally, the NCAA argued that its compensation restrictions attract schools
with a “philosophical commitment to amateurism” to compete at the Division I
level while also enabling schools that otherwise could not afford to compete in
Division I to do so.286 Overall, these rules allow for more schools and
student-athletes to participate in Division I, which increases the overall output
of its product, the NCAA argued.287 However, testimony of several university
and collegiate sport officials revealed a belief that most schools would remain
in Division I athletics even if compensation restrictions were removed.288 And,
in any event, the plaintiffs sought an injunction that allowed schools to
compensate their student-athletes, not one that required student-athlete
compensation.289 The court reasoned that schools would not be driven to
financial ruin or leave Division I because they could simply opt not to pay their
student-athletes.290 Therefore, the court concluded that the compensation
restrictions do not increase the output of Division I basketball and FBS
football.291 Thus, the justification was not procompetitive.292
Ultimately, the NCAA found its footing, albeit shakily, on two of its four
procompetitive justifications: amateurism and the integration of academics and
athletics.293 For amateurism, the court found that preventing student-athletes
from receiving large sums of money may increase consumer demand.294 For
integration of academics and athletics, the court found that restrictions on pay
may serve to integrate student-athletes into their communities, improving the

284. Id.
285. Id. (emphasis added).
286. Id. at 1003-04.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 982 (citing testimony of University of South Carolina President, Dr. Harris Pastides;
Conference USA Commissioner, Britton Banowsky; University of Texas Associate Athletics Director,
Christine Plonsky; and Sports Management Expert, Dr. Daniel Rascher).
289. Id. at 1004.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 982.
292. Id. at 982, 1004.
293. Id. at 1004.
294. Id.
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quality of education services a school offers.295 Therefore, the burden shifted
back to the plaintiffs to show that amateurism and the integration can be
achieved through less restrictive alternatives.296
Plaintiffs identified two legitimate less restrictive alternatives297: (1) permit
schools to allow scholarships to cover the full cost of attendance at any given
Division I school; and (2) permit schools to hold limited and equal shares of
licensing revenues in a trust to be distributed to student-athletes after their
eligibility expires.298 Because this Comment focuses on cash compensation
above the costs of receiving an education, the subsequent discussion focuses on
the plaintiff’s second alternative.299
The court agreed that allowing schools to pay football and men’s basketball
student-athletes a limited amount of cash is a less restrictive means of
preserving consumer demand than are amateurism and academic integration.300
The court determined that, if the NCAA so chooses, it may cap these
student-athlete’s annual compensation at no less than five thousand dollars.301
The determination of five-thousand dollars was based exclusively on two
findings. First, NCAA witnesses had stated that their concerns regarding
student-athlete pay would decrease if the student-athletes were paid smaller
sums.302 Second, five thousand dollars is comparable to the amount that a
qualifying student-athlete would receive in federal grant monies.303 On these
two facts alone, the five-thousand-dollar value was determined. If the NCAA

295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Plaintiffs proposed a third less restrictive alternative: allowing student-athletes to receive money for
endorsements. Id. at 984. In the findings of fact, the court concluded this was not a legitimate less restrictive
alternative because it “would undermine the efforts of both the NCAA and its member schools to protect
against the ‘commercial exploitation’ of student-athletes.” Id.
298. Id. at 1005.
299. The first alternative—increasing scholarships to the full cost of attendance—was granted by the
district court, affirmed by the Ninth Circuit appellate court, and concurrently adopted by the NCAA. Id. at
982-83, 1006; O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F. 3d 1049, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2015); NCAA,
2015-16 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 15, 15.1, at 190 (Oct. 2014). The change has not been without
consequence, though. See Blair Kerkhoff & Tod Palmer, They’re Not Paychecks, But Major College Athletes
Got Extra Scholarship Stipends for First Time This School Year, KAN. CITY STAR, June 30, 2016,
http://www.kansascity.com/sports/college/article86062792.html (discussing the inequities that cost of
attendance scholarships have created between schools, sports, and genders).
300. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 983.
301. Id. at 1008.
302. Id. at 983, 1008.
303. Id. at 1008.
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did not set a cap, the cash payments would be entirely up to the discretion of
each school.304
The court further found that the effects of student-athlete pay on consumer
demand would be minimized if held in trust until after the student-athlete leaves
school.305 Amateurism and academic integration were too restrictive as means
of maintaining consumer demand.306 Permissive—but not required—cash
payments of up to five thousand dollars were found to be a less restrictive means
of maintaining consumer demand.307 Accordingly, the NCAA was enjoined
from prohibiting such payments.308
With that, the court delivered a “resounding rebuke”309 to the amateurism
foundation of the NCAA, becoming the first of any federal court to find any
aspect of the NCAA’s amateurism rules as violative of antitrust law.310 FBS
football players and Division I men’s basketball players could now collectively
earn an estimated $300 million over a four-year period.311 Schools could engage
in bidding wars for the best high school football and basketball
student-athletes.312 And those not discussed in the O’Bannon decision—female
and other non-football or basketball student-athletes—would be left to wonder
if they, too, would be compensated or, worse yet, if they would have a team to
play on at all.313 A timely appeal by the NCAA gave the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals an opportunity to speak on the matter.314

304. Ben Strauss & Marc Tracy, N.C.A.A. Must Allow College to Pay Athletes, Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 8, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/sports/federal-judge-rules-against-ncaa-in-obannoncase.html (“The amounts in the trust funds would be up to the discretion of institutions.”).
305. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 983-84.
306. Id. at 1007.
307. Id. at 1007-08.
308. Id. The court also held that the NCAA may prohibit schools from funding these stipends or trusts
with anything other than revenue derived from the use of players’ NILs. Id. at 1005.
309. Strauss & Tracy, supra note 304.
310. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015) (“As far as we
are aware, the district court’s decision is the first by any federal court to hold that any aspect of the NCAA’s
amateurism rules violate the antitrust laws, let alone to mandate by injunction that the NCAA change its
practices.”).
311. Strauss & Tracy, supra note 304.
312. Id.
313. Solomon, supra note 44. See Boninger, supra note 29, at 801-05 (discussing the NCAA’s inability
to provide equal athletic opportunities to men and women without restrictions).
314. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d 1049.

MCDAVIS COMMENT 29.1 (DO NOT DELETE)

318

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

12/2/18 2:29 AM

[Vol. 29:1

3. Ninth Circuit Decision
On appeal, the NCAA again relied on the Supreme Court’s seminal Board
of Regents decision.315 The NCAA argued that the Board of Regents decision
established that amateurism restrictions are presumptively procompetitive.316
The court noted that, if the NCAA’s argument were to be accepted, then any
restriction related to amateurism would be automatically valid.317 The NCAA
would effectively have an exemption from antitrust scrutiny for any restrictions
made to preserve amateurism.318 The court would not be so generous. The court
reasoned that the Board of Regents decision only mentioned amateurism rules
in such a positive light to justify its application of the rule of reason analysis
where others might apply the per se analysis.319 The language is not a part of
the final holding. Thus, the court concluded that the Supreme Court language
regarding amateurism is dicta that will be given appropriate deference “where
applicable.”320
The court also found that the Supreme Court’s Board of Regents decision
did not compel a decision in favor of the NCAA.321 The NCAA read Board of
Regents as standing for the proposition that its amateurism restrictions are
presumptively procompetitive.322 However, under the rule of reason analysis,
an anticompetitive restriction violates antitrust law if a substantially less restrictive alternative exists.323 Therefore, a court may still find that the NCAA
restrictions, even if justified, violate antitrust law where a substantially less
restrictive alternative exists. Thus, Board of Regents does not mean amateurism
restrictions are automatically valid under Sherman antitrust law.324
With preliminary legal arguments dealt with, the court turned to the merits
of the appeal under a “clear error” standard of review.325 The NCAA focused
315. On appeal, the NCAA made two additional arguments based on legal formalities that will not be
discussed in this Comment: (1) that the NCAA’s compensation restrictions are not covered by the Sherman
Act because they do not regulate commercial activity; and (2) that the plaintiffs do not have standing under
the Sherman Act because they have not suffered antitrust injury. Id. at 1061. The court was not persuaded
by either argument. Id.
316. Id. at 1061-62.
317. Id. at 1063.
318. Id.
319. Id. (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 103 (1984)).
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 1063-64.
323. Id. at 1064 (“[A] restraint that serves a procompetitive purpose can still be invalid under the Rule of
Reason if a substantially less restrictive rule would further the same objectives equally well.”).
324. Id.
325. Id. at 1061 (“We review the district court’s findings of fact after the bench trial for clear error.”).
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its appeal entirely on amateurism, arguing that the district court did not give
amateurism enough credit as a procompetitive justification.326 The NCAA
argued that its amateurism restrictions are procompetitive because they increase
opportunities for student-athletes by giving them the only opportunity to obtain
an education while competing as students.327 The court agreed that broadening
choices available to student-athletes can make a restraint procompetitive.328
However, the court was unable to see the link between compensation restrictions
and increased opportunities to student-athletes.329 Thus, the argument that
amateurism rules increase opportunities for student-athletes was rejected on
appeal.330
Ultimately, with regard to the NCAA’s procompetitive justifications, the
circuit court agreed with the district court’s holdings.331 The compensation
restrictions play a limited role in: (1) integrating academics with athletics; and
(2) preserving consumer demand by promoting amateurism.332 As discussed,
anticompetitive restrictions, even if supported by procompetitive justifications,
are still in violation of antitrust law if less restrictive alternatives exist.
Accordingly, the court turned to evaluate the legitimacy of the less restrictive
alternatives.333
The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s Board of Regents
decision to evaluate the less restrictive alternatives—"[W]e must generally
afford the NCAA ‘ample latitude’ to superintend college athletics.”334 To afford
the NCAA that deference, the Circuit Court makes clear that only a “strong

326. Id. at 1072 (“[The NCAA] argues to us that the district court gave the amateurism justification short
shrift”). Accordingly, the court accepted the district court’s conclusions regarding the NCAA’s other
procompetitive justifications because the NCAA did not offer any meaningful argument. Id.
327. Id. The NCAA also argued that the District Court was inappropriately skeptical of the Association’s
historical commitment to amateurism. Id. at 1073. The Ninth Circuit agreed, but found it was ultimately
irrelevant because a proven commitment to amateurism does not equate to a finding that amateurism has
procompetitive effects. Id.
328. Id. at 1072.
329. Id. In a footnote, the court noted that the link may be that the compensation restriction reduces the
schools’ costs, allowing them to fund more scholarships and thereby increase the number of opportunities that
recruits have to play college sports. Id. at 1073 n.16. The court found this argument to be tantamount to the
NCAA’s increased output argument, which had been rejected by the district court. Id. The NCAA had not
directly challenged that holding on appeal and, on that basis, the court affirmed the lower court’s holding. Id.
at 1072-73 n.16.
330. Id. at 1073.
331. Id. (“We therefore conclude that the NCAA’s compensation rules serve the two procompetitive
purposes identified by the district court.”).
332. Id. at 1072-73.
333. Id. at 1074.
334. Id. (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 120 (1984)).
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evidentiary showing”335 that the proposed alternative is “virtually as
effective”336 at achieving the legitimate procompetitive justification will be
sufficient to meet the plaintiff’s burden.
On the first alternative to the compensation restriction—allowing schools
to offer full cost of attendance scholarships—the plaintiffs met their burden.337
Under NCAA standards, student-athletes remain amateurs as long as their
compensation is for legitimate educational expenses.338 Allowing
student-athletes to receive cost of attendance scholarships therefore has no
impact on amateurism.339 The court affirmed the district court’s finding that
restricting scholarships to only grant-in-aid is a violation of antitrust law.340
As for the second alternative—paying student-athletes small amounts of
deferred cash compensation—the court was clear: “We cannot agree that a rule
permitting schools to pay students pure cash compensation and a rule forbidding
them from paying NIL compensation are both equally effective in promoting
amateurism and preserving consumer demand.”341 Indeed, “not paying
student-athletes is precisely what makes them amateurs”342 and “[t]he difference
between offering student-athletes education-related compensation and offering
them cash sums untethered to education expenses is not minor; it is a quantum
leap.”343 The circuit court found the lower court’s decision to be based on
“threadbare evidence.”344 Additionally, the court was concerned with the
possibility of a slippery slope where lawsuits would be brought until the
five-thousand-dollar limit no longer existed, destroying amateurism in its

335. Id.
336. Id. at 1076.
337. Id. at 1075-76.
338. Id. at 1075 (“[B]y the NCAA’s own standards, student-athletes remain amateurs as long as any
money paid to them goes to cover legitimate educational expenses.”).
339. Id.
340. Id. at 1075-76. Grant-in-aid scholarships cover most of the costs associated with attending a
university, whereas cost-of-attendance scholarships cover all of the costs associated with attending a
university. See Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Autonomy Schools Adopt Cost of Attendance Scholarships: College
Athletes’ Viewpoints Dominate Business Session Discussion, NCAA (Jan. 18, 2015),
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/autonomy-schools-adopt-cost-attendance-scholarships
(“[I]n addition to tuition, fees, books and room and board, the scholarship will also include expenses such as
academic-related supplies, transportation and other similar items. The value of those benefits can differ from
campus to campus.”).
341. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1076 (9th Cir. 2015).
342. Id. (emphasis in original).
343. Id. at 1078 (“[T]he district court cannot plausibly conclude that being a poorly-paid professional
collegiate athlete is ‘virtually as effective’ for the market as being [an] amateur.”).
344. Id. at 1077 (“[T]he court relied on threadbare evidence in finding that small payments of cash
compensation will preserve amateurism as well [as] the NCAA’s rule forbidding such payments.”).
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entirety.345 Once again referring to the “ample latitude”346 that the NCAA must
be afforded, the court vacated the district court’s allowance of cash payments:
“The Rule of Reason requires that the NCAA permit its schools to provide up
to the cost of attendance to their student athletes. It does not require more.”347
With that, the Ninth Circuit had spoken, affirming in part and vacating in
part the decision of the lower court. The district court and the circuit court
agreed on several issues, chief among them being: (1) the Board of Regents
decision does not give the NCAA carte blanche authority to enforce restrictions
under the guise of amateurism; and (2) student-athletes should receive
compensation equal to the cost of attending their respective institution. As for
disagreement, the circuit court can be seen to have overturned the lower court’s
allowance of cash compensation for two reasons. First, the district court simply
did not have the evidence to support a finding that amateurism can be achieved
by delayed payments of cash. Second, student-athletes cannot receive
compensation above the costs of their educational expenses because to do so
would violate their status as amateurs.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision is current law.348 Today’s Division I
student-athlete enjoys the opportunity to receive a full cost of attendance
scholarship and all of the benefits of competing at the highest level in collegiate
sport.349 Cash compensation remains restricted. It is unclear how long
compensation restrictions will last, however. The next section of this Comment
discusses Alston,350 a student-athlete compensation case that is currently being
argued in the same district court that permitted student-athlete compensation
before being overruled.
C. Current NCAA Litigation: Alston
Several former student-athletes351 have stepped into the shoes once
occupied by Ed O’Bannon to challenge those same compensation restrictions
345. Id. at 1079.
346. Id. (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 120 (1984)).
347. Id.
348. The Supreme Court denied review of the appellate court decision. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016) (denying certiorari).
349. Benefits such as meal plans; money for books and miscellaneous expenses; academic counseling
and tutoring; life skill training; nutritional advice; professional coaching; strength and fitness training; and
support from athletic trainers and physical therapists. Dorfman, supra note 17.
350. In re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig. (Alston), No. 4:14-md-02541-CW, 2017 BL
437266 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
351. Namely: Shawne Alston, Martin Jenkins, Johnathan Moore, Kevin Perry, William Tyndall, Alex
Lauricella, Sharriff Floyd, Kyle Theret, Duane Bennett, Chris Stone, John Bohannon, Ashley Holliday, Chris
Davenport, Nicholas Kindler, Kendall Gregory-McGhee, India Chaney, Michel’le Thomas, Don “DJ” Banks,
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that the NCAA enforces to protect amateurism. Represented by the prominent
sports labor lawyer, Jeffrey Kessler, the plaintiffs seek to undo all NCAA
restrictions against compensating student-athletes, creating a free market where
conferences may choose to offer compensation packages to prized recruits.352
Like in O’Bannon, the plaintiffs allege that the NCAA violates federal antitrust
law by restricting the compensation a student-athlete may receive.353
Accordingly, the plaintiffs seek an injunction against the NCAA’s rules limiting
compensation for student-athletes.354
Recognizing that the allegations made in Alston are essentially identical to
those in O’Bannon, the NCAA moved to dismiss the claims under the doctrine
of stare decisis.355 Judge Claudia Wilken, the same judge that presided over the
first O’Bannon decision that allowed for cash payments of five thousand dollars,
denied the motion.356 She reasoned that the O’Bannon decision makes clear that
student-athletes cannot receive cash compensation untethered to educational
expenses.357 Although it is not written in her short opinion, Judge Wilken is
clearly suggesting that other benefits may be made available for student-athletes
in lieu of cash compensation. Indeed, plaintiffs’ attorney Jeffrey Kessler argued

Kendall Timmons, Dax Dellenbach, Nigel Hayes, Anfornee Stewart, Kenyata Johnson, Barry Brunetti,
Dalenta Jameral “D.J.” Stephens, Justine Hartman, Afure Jemerigbe, and Alec James. Parties for In Re:
National Collegiate Athletic Association Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation, 4:14-md-02541, CT.
LISTENER, https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/4495063/parties/in-re-national-collegiate-athletic-association-athletic-grant-in-aid-cap/ [https://perma.cc/6QBX-WXK7] (last visited Dec. 13, 2018).
352. See Will Hobson, After NCAA Settlement, Sports Lawyer Jeffrey Kessler Continues Fight to Upend
Amateurism, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2017/02/07/ncaasettlement-on-past-cost-of-attendance-stipends-is-not-nearly-enough-sports-lawyer-jeffrey-kessler/?utm_term=.ea57e6c63f16; see also Travis Waldron, A Trip To the Men’s Room Turned Jeff Kessler Into
the NCAA’s Worst Nightmare, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/jeffrey-kessler-ncaa-lawsuit_us_59723f33e4b00e4363df3f59.
353. Order Denying Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, No. 14-md-2541-CW, 2016 WL 4154855
(N.D. Cal. 2016).
354. Id. The plaintiffs do not seek damages. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Cross-Motions
for Summary Judgment, In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., No.
14-md-02541-CW, 2018 WL 1524005, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
355. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support Thereof, In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., No.
14MD02541, 2016 WL 4943915 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
[U]nder the doctrine of stare decisis, the Jenkins and consolidated action plaintiffs are not
entitled to relitigate the question of whether defendants’ rules prohibiting member schools
from paying student-athletes more than their cost of attendance violate the Sherman Act,
and they are not entitled to an injunction against the enforcement of those rules.
Id.
356. Order Denying Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, supra note 353, at *2.
357. Id. (“The Ninth Circuit’s decision in O’Bannon simply forecloses one type of relief Plaintiffs
previously sought: cash compensation untethered to educational expenses.”).
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this very notion during oral arguments.358 Specifically, Kessler argued that the
NCAA could provide tuition for graduate school; improved health care for
student-athletes; and funds for athletes’ families to attend on recruiting trips,
among other benefits.359
Both parties moved for summary judgment.360 Like O’Bannon, the
summary judgment determination revolved around the veracity of amateurism.
The plaintiffs sought to convince the court that amateurism is a myth that does
not justify restricting compensation exclusively to academic scholarships.361
The NCAA sought to affirm amateurism as fundamental to the appeal of
collegiate sport and to have the court reaffirm that the NCAA must be afforded
ample latitude to protect amateurism.362
Unsurprisingly, Judge Wilken did not grant the NCAA’s motion for
summary judgment.363
The plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion was premised on the idea that the
NCAA takes an inconsistent approach to restricting financial aid, generally
limiting aid to cost of attendance in most cases but also allowing aid to exceed
cost of attendance in certain specific instances.364 Thus, as the plaintiffs would
have it, the compensation restrictions are unprincipled restraints that cause
unjustified anticompetitive effects.365 The NCAA was unable create a factual
dispute on this point and the court found that the compensation restraints do

358. Steve Berkowitz, Judge Rejects NCAA’s Request for Dismissal of ‘Kessler,’ Alston Suits, USA
TODAY, Aug. 5, 2016, https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/other/2016/08/05/ncaa-suit-shawnealston-martin-jenkins-kessler-berman-nigel-hayes-claudia-wilken/88313408/.
359. Id.
360. Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgement; Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support Thereof, No. 4:14-md-02541-CW, 2017 WL 3525667 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Defendants’
Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment and for Exclusion of Expert Testimony, and Opposition
to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig. (Alston),
No. 4:14-md-02541-CW, 2017 WL 4348498 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
361. “Defendants’ price-fixing justification based on their ever-elusive concept of ‘amateurism’ is simply
their version of a three-card Monte game in which the line defining amateurism never stays in the same place.”
Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgement; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support Thereof, supra note 360, at 1.
362. Defendants’ Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment and for Exclusion of Expert
Testimony, and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 360 (discussing the
century-old principle of amateurism and the courts’ continued recognition that the NCAA must have ample
latitude to enforce rules to protect amateurism).
363. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 354,
at *15.
364. Id. at *9 (“Plaintiffs contend that because Defendants permit student-athletes to be paid money that
does not go ‘to cover legitimate education expenses,’ they are not amateurs.”).
365. Id. at *7 (“Plaintiffs contend that . . . Defendants cannot meet their burden to prove that the restraints
have procompetitive benefits.”).
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produce significant anticompetitive effects in the relevant market366 as a matter
of law.367
The burden shifted to the NCAA to provide procompetitive justifications
for the compensation restrictions. The NCAA proffered the two surviving
procompetitive justifications from O’Bannon: integrating academics with
athletics and preserving the popularity of the NCAA’s product by promoting its
current understanding of amateurism.368 The court found that a factual dispute
existed and that these two justifications must be proved at trial once again.369
The NCAA offered seven additional procompetitive justifications.370 The
court found that six of them had no evidentiary support and dismissed them.371
The NCAA’s seventh procompetitive justification called for the court to
consider the expanded opportunities that the NCAA is able to provide as a result
of the compensation restrictions:
The challenged rules serve the procompetitive goals of
expanding output in the college education market and
improving the quality of the collegiate experience for
student-athletes, other students, and alumni by maintaining the
unique heritage and traditions of college athletics and
preserving amateurism as a foundation principle, thereby
distinguishing amateur college athletics from professional
sports, allowing the former to exist as a distinct form of athletic

366. The relevant market was the same as in O’Bannon: “the market for a college education combined
with athletics or alternatively the market for the student-athletes’ athletic services.” Id. at *8.
367. The NCAA once again relied on O’Bannon precedent, arguing that stare decisis barred an allegation
that the compensation restrictions cause anticompetitive effects. Id. at *8. The court was once again
unpersuaded.
368. Id.
369. Id. (“[T]he validity of the specific rules challenged in this cased ‘must be proved, not presumed.’”)
(citing O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1064 (9th Cir. 2015)).
370. The seven additional justifications were:
(1) expanding output in the college education market . . . ; (2) widening opportunities for
student-athletes to attend college through athletics scholarships . . . ; (3) promoting support
for college and universities . . . ; (4) creating a more diverse student body; (5) providing a
broader scope of athletic program offerings . . . ; (6) promoting competitive balance . . . ;
and (7) promoting competitive fairness and improving the quality of college education . . .
Defendants’ Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment and for Exclusion of Expert Testimony,
and Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 360.
371. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 354,
at *10 (stating that “Defendants have not attempted to meet [their] burden at all” and that “the Court will grant
summary judgment on these six procompetitive justifications” against the NCAA).
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rivalry and as an essential component of a comprehensive
college education.372
This final procompetitive justification is reminiscent of the “increased
output” justification proffered by the NCAA in O’Bannon.373 The court
correctly notes that this justification is distinct because it implicates all
student-athletes, students, and alumni, where the “increased output”
justification in O’Bannon was cabined to increased output for just those
student-athletes in football and men’s basketball.374
Here, the court was asked to consider those “other players” in college sports
other than men’s basketball and football. And the NCAA provides evidentiary
support to validate this procompetitive justification. Dr. Elzinga, an expert for
the NCAA, concluded that the relevant market is not simply a one-sided market
where the schools are either a seller of an education and athletic opportunities
or buyers of athletic services.375 Rather, Dr. Elzinga concluded that the relevant
market is a “multi-sided market for college education in the United States” and
that restrictions must be enforced to provide an optimal balance for all
participants.376 The NCAA also provided testimony from the plaintiffs’ expert,
Dr. Lazear, stating that demand in the college education market may include
alumni, viewers, and other students.377 The testimony of these experts suggests
that the relevant market is larger than the current view adopted by the court,
where procompetitive justifications are cabined to those existing within specific
sports. Under this procompetitive justification, which implicates a broader
relevant market, the court would have to consider all players involved in
collegiate athletics. The court dismissed this procompetitive justification,
too.378
The court reasoned that, even if all reasonable inferences were drawn in
favor of the NCAA, the evidence did not support the proffered justification
372. Id. at *10.
373. Recall the fourth procompetitive justification proffered by the NCAA in O’Bannon: “The NCAA
asserts that its challenged rules are reasonable and procompetitive because they enable it to increase the
number of opportunities available to schools and student-athletes to participate in FBS football and Division
I basketball, which ultimately increases the number of games that can be played.” O’Bannon v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
374. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 354,
at *11.
375. Order on Motions to Exclude Proposed Expert Testimony, In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n
Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig. (Alston), No. 14-md-02541-CW, at 5 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (comparing
Dr. Elzinga’s determination of the relevant market to the single-sided market definition adopted by the court).
376. Id. at 5.
377. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 354,
at *11.
378. Id.
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because Dr. Elzinga was not expressly referring to the “increased output”
justification when making his comments.379 Thus, his comments were
mischaracterized and insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact.380
The court makes no attempt to disqualify Dr. Lazear’s testimony, which the
NCAA also relied on as evidence for the justification.381
The seven additional procompetitive justifications were dismissed.382 With
the NCAA’s two surviving procompetitive justifications, the burden shifted to
back to the plaintiffs to provide a less restrictive alternative for meeting those
surviving justifications.
Plaintiffs provided two less restrictive alternatives: allow Division I
conferences to set the rules regulating education and athletic participation
expenses that the member institutions may provide; or remove all rules
prohibiting payments of any kind that are related to educational expenses and
any payments that are incidental to athletic participation.383
The plaintiffs did not seek summary judgment on the less restrictive
alternatives, preferring to prove their validity at trial.384 The NCAA did seek
summary judgment on these less restrictive alternatives, however, arguing they
were foreclosed by O’Bannon.385 The NCAA was unsuccessful.386 The court
found that O’Bannon does not foreclose the plaintiffs’ less restrictive
alternatives.387
With that, the court had once again spoken on the issue of student-athlete
pay. The court made clear that O’Bannon stands for the idea that
student-athletes may not receive cash untethered to educational expenses. But
nothing more. The NCAA has two procompetitive justifications that have some
salience in the eyes of the court: integrating athletics and academics; and
preserving the popularity of college sports through the preservation of
amateurism. The plaintiffs have the upper hand. The relevant market is
apparently cabined to restrictions and justifications that exist in a narrow
market, exclusive to men’s and women’s basketball and FBS football
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. at *10-11.
383. Id. at *12-13. Plaintiffs’ Opening Argument at 41-42, In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic
Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig. (Alston), No. 4:14-md-02541-CW, 2017 BL 437266 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27,
2018).
384. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 354,
at *11.
385. Id.
386. Id. at *11-12.
387. Id.
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student-athletes. And, for now, two less restrictive alternatives exist that will
change the face of the NCAA as we know it if they are not defeated.
Oral Argument commences on September 4, 2018 and concludes on
September 25, 2018.388 Judge Wilken’s decision is expected in late 2018.389
The concept of amateurism has been obfuscated by a barrage of antitrust
claims and misleading rhetoric. Over a century ago, amateurism was introduced
as a means of ensuring a safe and equitable playing field for a large swath of
student-athletes. Today, claims are largely brought for the exclusive benefit of
the revenue generating sports of men’s basketball and football.390 The value of
a free education goes unmentioned as claim after claim alleges that
student-athletes receive no compensation for their efforts. And, the
consequences of a regime where some student-athletes are paid, while others
are not, goes largely undiscussed in any meaningful way by the courts. Here,
the court has the opportunity to redirect the conversation toward the value of
amateurism in a meaningful way. The remainder of this Comment argues that
the court should do exactly that.
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT GOT IT RIGHT IN O’BANNON
Judge Wilken and the Northern District Court of California (and all other
courts for that matter) should recognize that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
O’Bannon was correct. 391 To come to this conclusion, one must first consider
the general reason that these antitrust cases are brought against the NCAA: to
remedy the perceived exploitation of former, current, and future
student-athletes. Payments of five thousand dollars do not remedy that
perceived exploitation.392 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit opinion reflects the Court’s
concern that allowing limited and delayed payments of five-thousand dollars
was only considered a “first step” towards realizing an outcome where
student-athletes received more compensation. It is likely that the “next step”
would have been another antitrust lawsuit raising the limit from five-thousand
388. Minute Order, In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.
(Alston), No. 4:14-md-02541-CW, 2017 BL 437266 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2018).
389. Id. at *15.
390. Arguably, women’s basketball was included in litigation for the exclusive purpose of satisfying
federal Title IX regulations. In the NCAA’s opening statement, the NCAA correctly points out women’s
basketball is never mentioned in the Plaintiffs’ Opening Statement. Defendants’ Opening Statement at 21, In
re Nat’ Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig. (Alston),
No. 4:14-md-02541-CW, 2017 BL 437266 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2018) (“[Plaintiffs’] never say a word about
women’s basketball in particular.”).
391. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
392. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (allowing
for student-athletes to receive up to five-thousand dollars in a trust per year while eligible).
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dollars to twenty-thousand dollars, and so on. The Ninth Circuit expressly
acknowledged this very issue: “[W]e have little doubt that plaintiffs will
continue to challenge the arbitrary limit imposed by the district court until they
have captured the full value of their NIL.”393
During the O’Bannon trial, several individuals testified that their concern
regarding student-athlete pay would be heightened if those payments were
large.394 The district court acknowledged these concerns and concluded that
small payments would be a better alternative for preserving amateurism than
restricting payments altogether would be.395 Small payments are not a valid
alternative when the legal action is brought to remedy the perceived exploitation
of student-athletes that generate millions of dollars of revenue (not profits) for
their university. This concern was also acknowledged by the Ninth Circuit:
“[T]he district court cannot plausibly conclude that being a poorly-paid
professional collegiate athlete is ‘virtually as effective’ for that market as being
[an] amateur.”396
For example, consider lead plaintiff Ed O’Bannon. O’Bannon led the
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) Bruins to a college basketball
championship after a twenty-year drought. He averaged 20.4 points and 8.3
rebounds and was named the most outstanding basketball player in all of college
basketball.397 UCLA likely generated hundreds of thousands of dollars, if not
millions, in revenues (again, not profits) as a result of Mr. O’Bannon’s efforts.
Annual payments of five-thousand dollars, which O’Bannon could not have
collected until he was done playing, do not eliminate the perceived exploitation.
Indeed, the ultimate payment O’Bannon would have received would pale in
comparison to the revenues he likely generated for UCLA. The district court’s
decision does not remedy the perceived exploitation. It only serves to
undermine amateurism.
Furthermore, the district court was unduly skeptical of the NCAA’s historic
commitment to amateurism,398 leading to a conclusion that amateurism is only

393. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079.
394. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 983.
395. Id.
396. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1076.
397. SPORTS PEOPLE: COLLEGE BASKETBALL; O’Bannon Receives the Wooden Award, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 8, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/08/sports/sports-people-college-basketball-o-bannon-receives-the-wooden-award.html.
398. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged this skepticism and suggested it may disagree with the district
court’s conclusion: “[The NCAA] faults the district court for being inappropriately skeptical of the NCAA’s
historical commitment to amateurism . . . . we might have credited the depth of the NCAA’s devotion to
amateurism differently.” O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1072.
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somewhat procompetitive.399 As discussed in this Comment, the NCAA was
founded partially on the premise that amateurism must be preserved within
collegiate athletics.400 The district court concluded that the NCAA is not truly
committed to amateurism because it has adjusted its definition numerous times
in its century-old existence.401 However, an ideal with an evolving definition
does not necessarily mean that an organization is less committed to that ideal.
As discussed, the NCAA is the first organization in the world to affirmatively
define amateurism. It should not be forced to stand by an antiquated definition
as the world around it continues to develop. Rather, it should be afforded the
opportunity to develop the definition, allowing for the most equitable and
all-encompassing result possible.
For example, the district court pointed to the fact that the NCAA allows
Division I tennis recruits to preserve their amateur status despite having
“accept[ed] ten thousand dollars in prize money the year before he enrolls in
college” while a track and field athlete is not afforded the same opportunity.402
The district court concluded that this was demonstrative of the NCAA’s
malleable and contradictory approach to amateurism.403 However, as discussed
in this Comment, the decision to allow tennis recruits to receive prize money
was done in an effort to allow tennis players, mostly foreign, the ability to
recoup the major costs associated with training, traveling, and entrance into
competitions. The NCAA similarly allows prospective student-athletes in all
other sports in the United States to have their training, traveling, and entrance
costs covered by corporate sponsors prior to their enrollment in the college.404
The NCAA is shifting the burdensome costs of preparing for college athletics
399. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1001 (“[Amateurism] restrictions on student-athlete compensation play
a limited role in driving consumer demand.”) (emphasis added).
400. See Jones v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 392 F. Supp. 295, 304 (D. Mass. 1975).
The N.C.A.A. was originally established to promote amateurism in college sports and to
integrate intercollegiate athletics into the educational programs of its member institutions.
The N.C.A.A. eligibility rules were . . . designed to . . . implement the N.C.A.A. basic
principles of amateurism, principles which have been at the heart of the Association since
its founding.
Id.
401. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1000.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. The NCAA permits the actual and necessary expenses associated with competition to be reimbursed
by permissible sources such as event sponsors and club teams. See NCAA, 2017-18 NCAA DIVISION I
MANUAL art. 12, 12.02.6, at 62 (Aug. 1, 2017); see also Adam Himmelsbach, Club Team, Nike Reap Benefits
of Sponsorship, COURIER J., Oct. 17, 2014, https://www.courier-journal.com/story/sports/college/basketball/2014/10/17/club-team-nike-reap-benefits-sponsorship/17458415/ (“Generally speaking, it is permissible
for basketball teams to be sponsored by companies and to provide prospective student-athletes with necessary
expenses like travel, food, etc.”).
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to corporate sponsors, which will be borne by member institutions of the NCAA
once the prospective student-athlete enrolls at a member school. An evolving
definition of amateurism is not a sign of contradiction, it is one of growth.
Even if the NCAA has some rules that are contradictory, that does not mean
that amateurism as a whole must be abandoned. Like any century-old
organization, the NCAA has missteps. Missteps do not justify complete
abandonment of the ideals upon which the Association was founded, primarily
amateurism. The Fifth Circuit has recognized as much: “That the NCAA has
not distilled amateurism to its purest form does not mean its attempts to maintain
a mixture containing some amateur elements are unreasonable.”405
The district court also challenged the extent to which amateurism generates
consumer interest.406 The Supreme Court has attempted to settle this issue as a
matter of law.407 But even if this were a question of fact, polls indicate that it is
an open question. In 2014, a Washington Post poll revealed that the public
generally opposes paying student-athletes at a rate almost double that of those
who support it.408 What is more, a large portion of those individuals whom
oppose paying student-athletes are strongly opposed to the idea.409 The
Washington Post poll revealed figures consistent with those presented by the
NCAA in trial.410 While these figures are not demonstrative of how the
consumer would actually act if student-athletes are paid, they are insightful as
to the preferences of the consumer. A product, such as collegiate athletics, is
arguably procompetitive if it seeks to maximize the preferences of the
consumer.411 The Ninth Circuit succeeded where the district failed by
recognizing this fact: “Having found that amateurism is integral to the NCAA’s

405. McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 845 F.2d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1988).
406. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 975-76.
407. In Board of Regents the Supreme Court makes clear that “athletes must not be paid” because it
preserves the character of college sports as compared to professional sports, which is in the consumers’
interest because it widens the choices available to sports fans. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of
Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 102, 117 (1984).
408. Alex Prewitt, Large Majority Opposes Paying NCAA Athletes, Washington Post-ABC News Poll
Finds, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/large-majority-opposes-paying-ncaa-athletes-washington-post-abc-news-poll-finds/2014/03/22/c411a32e-b130-11e3-95e839bef8e9a48b_story.html?utm_term=.a0ab74eea1a5.
409. Id. Forty-seven percent were found to be strongly against the idea of paying student-athletes. Id.
410. The NCAA survey revealed sixty-nine percent of respondents were opposed to paying
student-athletes while only twenty-eight percent were in favor of paying them. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at
975. The Washington Post poll revealed that sixty-four percent were opposed and thirty three percent were
in favor. Prewitt, supra note 408.
411. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102 (“[NCAA] actions widen consumer choice . . . and hence can be
viewed as procompetitive.”).
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market, the district court cannot plausibly conclude that [paying
student-athletes] is ‘virtually as effective’ . . . as being amateur.”412
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in O’Bannon is correct because it
properly affords the NCAA “ample latitude” in superintending collegiate
athletics, as required by the United States Supreme Court.413 More than thirty
years ago, the Supreme Court recognized higher education benefits in quality
and diversity through preservation of the student-athlete.414 These goals are
entirely consistent with the Sherman Act and for this reason, the Ninth Circuit’s
O’Bannon decision was correct.415
V. NCAA COMPENSATION RESTRICTIONS ARE PROCOMPETITIVE BECAUSE
THEY CREATE ANCILLARY BENEFITS IN CLOSELY RELATED MARKETS
Even if O’Bannon is viewed so narrowly as to only stand for prohibiting
one type of compensation—cash benefits untethered to education expenses416—
there is still good reason for permitting the NCAA to restrict compensation to
cost of attendance scholarships, and it starts with the analysis of the relevant
markets. As discussed, the rule of reason analysis is typically limited to those
restraints in a product market and the procompetitive benefits derived from
those restraints in the same product market. The O’Bannon decision limited the
rule of reason analysis to the anticompetitive effects in the markets of Division
I men’s basketball and FBS football.417 Alston similarly considers those two
revenue generating sports, and also nominally includes Division I women’s
basketball.418 In either case it is inappropriate to primarily consider certain
specified sports when the antitrust claims implicate all sports and
student-athletes under the NCAA’s purview.419 A regime change where
student-athletes can be compensated with cash, or in-kind benefits, will put
financial pressures on athletic departments across the country as they try to keep
412. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1076 (9th Cir. 2015).
413. Id. at 1079 (citing Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120).
414. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
415. Id.
416. Order Denying Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, supra note 353.
417. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 986-87 (N.D. Cal. 2014);
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1070-72.
418. See Defendants’ Opening Statement, supra note 390 (noting Plaintiffs’ failure to mention women’s
basketball in their opening statement, and suggesting that women’s basketball may have been included to
avoid Title IX obligations).
419. In the NCAA’s Opening Statement, the NCAA expressly states its disagreement with the district
court’s definition of the relevant market at issue, and reserves the right to challenge the finding. Defendants’
Opening Statement at 6 n.11, In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.
(Alston), No. 4:14-md-02541-CW, 2017 BL 437266 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2018).
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up with other institutions by offering competitive compensation packages to
prospective Division I men’s and women’s basketball, and FBS football
student-athletes. The ensuing financial pressures will result in non-revenue
generating sports being cut altogether.420 Indeed, financial pressures have
resulted in this very outcome in the past as a result of the financial pressures
accompanied by Title IX:
The NCAA observed that some college presidents had to close
academic departments, fire tenured faculty, and reduce the
number of sports offered to students due to the economic
restraints [of increasing support for women’s athletic
programs]. At the same time, many institutions felt pressure to
‘keep up with the Joneses’ by increasing spending on recruiting
talented players and coaches and on other aspects of their
programs in order to remain competitive with rival schools.421
Additionally, tuition costs for the general student body may increase as a
result of enlarged financial burdens on the athletic department.422 Because of
the pernicious effects of such a regime change, the courts should consider the
procompetitive benefits that the compensation restrictions provide in the closely
related markets of the non-revenue generating collegiate sports.
In Sullivan v. NFL,423 the court expressly considered those “ancillary
benefits” in a closely related market. The owner of the New England Patriots
brought antitrust action against the NFL for prohibiting him from offering for
sale public stock in the Patriots.424 The district court determined that the
relevant market was the market for public stock in NFL teams and a jury trial
resulted in a finding against the NFL for antitrust violations.425 On appeal, the
NFL argued that all procompetitive effects of its policy, even those in a market
different from that in which the alleged restraint operated, should have been

420. It will also lead to cuts within the revenue generating sports themselves. Jon Solomon, NCAA,
Conferences: Scholarships Would Be Cut If Players Are Paid, CBS SPORTS (May 1, 2015),
https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/ncaa-conferences-scholarships-would-be-cut-if-playersare-paid/ (“[I]f college athletes are allowed to be paid, the development would ‘likely lead many—if not
most—Division I institutions’ to reduce the number of scholarships for less-renowned football and men’s and
women’s basketball players.”).
421. Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1012 (10th Cir. 1998).
422. See Krupnick, supra note 31 (“The most likely outcome . . . would be for at least some . . .
universities to drop out of the big-time sports by eliminating athletics scholarships or otherwise scaling back
sports programs rather than risking protests by paying athletes and charging students more.”).
423. 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994).
424. Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1096 (1st Cir. 1994).
425. Id.
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considered by the district court.426 Specifically, the NFL argued that its public
ownership restrictions ensure that NFL stakeholders are focused on the
long-term interests of the league as a whole, rather than short-term dividend
interests.427 The NFL reasoned that these aligned interests allow the NFL to
better compete in the entertainment market.428 The NFL further reasoned that
the entertainment market is closely related to the market identified by the district
court—the market for public ownership in NFL teams.429 Thus, the NFL argued
that the anticompetitive harms in the market for public ownership in NFL teams
can be compared with the resulting procompetitive benefits in the market for
entertainment.430 Significantly, the First Circuit court agreed and remanded the
case for those benefits in the entertainment market to be considered431:
[W]e can draw at least one general conclusion from the case
law at this point: courts should generally give a measure of
latitude to antitrust defendants in their efforts to explain the
procompetitive justifications for their policies and practices.432
Like the First Circuit, the district court should consider the benefits being
realized in the closely related markets of non-revenue generating sports as a
result of the men’s basketball and FBS football compensation restrictions. In
Sullivan, the stated market was public ownership in NFL teams and the closely
related market was entertainment.433 Here, the stated markets are the revenue
generating sports of Division I men’s basketball and FBS football. The closely
related market is non-revenue generating collegiate sport. In Sullivan, the First
Circuit required the district court to consider the benefits being realized in the
entertainment market as a result of those public ownership restrictions.434 The
district court here should similarly consider the benefits being realized by the
student-athletes participating in non-revenue generating sport as a result of
compensation restrictions in Division I men’s basketball and FBS football. The

426. Id. at 1111.
427. Id. at 1102.
428. Id. at 1112-13.
429. Id. at 1112.
430. Id.
431. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals actually gave the district court a choice. On remand, the district
court could allow the jury to consider the benefits to competition in the closely related market or the court
could have the jury make a final determination without considering a relevant market whatsoever. Id. at 1113.
432. Id. at 1112.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 1113 (“These procompetitive justifications should have been considered by the jury.”).
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major benefit being realized is the increased opportunity for student-athletes to
compete in amateur sport while earning a quality education.435
This is not a radical proposition. The Fifth Circuit has previously
considered, and upheld, NCAA restrictions because the non-revenue generating
sports benefit from those restrictions. In Hennessey v. National Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, coaches brought an antitrust action against the NCAA because
the Association had introduced a new bylaw that limited the number of assistant
coaches a school could employ.436 The court recounted that the bylaw had been
introduced to preserve the long-term interests of the entire association:
Colleges with more successful programs, both competitively
and economically, were seen as taking advantage of their
success by expanding their programs, to the ultimate detriment
of the whole system of intercollegiate athletics. Financial
pressures upon many members, not merely to “catch up”, but
to “keep up”, were beginning to threaten both the competitive,
and the amateur, nature of the programs, leading quite possibly
to the abandonment by many. “Minor” and “minority” sports
were viewed as imperiled by concentration upon the
“money makers”, such as varsity football and basketball.437
The court upheld the restriction, noting that the fundamental objective of
the rule was to reorient schools into maintaining “their traditional role as
amateur sports operating as part of the educational processes.”438 In Alston, the
court has the opportunity to similarly reorient the focus of Division I men’s
basketball and FBS football from their purely commercial objectives back to
their academic pursuits while competing as amateur student-athletes. The
longevity of collegiate athletics stands to benefit from such a reorientation of
the otherwise commercialistic objectives held by revenue generating sports. As
mentioned, the major benefit will be the continued viability of non-revenue
generating sports that risk succumbing to financial pressures.
The benefit that stands to be gained—increased opportunities to earn a
quality education while competing in amateur sport—should, at the very least,
435. In O’Bannon, the district court considered, and refuted, the NCAA’s argument that compensation
restrictions are procompetitive because they increase opportunities to compete in FBS Football and men’s
Division I basketball. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 981-82 (N.D. Cal.
2014). This Comment argues that the increased opportunities to all student athletes should be considered and
that those opportunities include increased access to a quality education. See Boninger, supra note 29, at 805
(concluding that “the NCAA’s prohibitions on compensation are necessary for schools to continue to provide
equality of collegiate athletic opportunities for men and women.”).
436. 564 F.2d 1136, 1141 (5th Cir. 1977).
437. Id. at 1153.
438. Id.
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be considered by courts in both an economic and a social welfare sense. In an
economic sense, the restriction results in increased consumer choice by making
NCAA member institutions more accessible to a greater number of prospective
student-athletes.439 Similarly, it maintains access for the general student body
by keeping “general fees” from being arbitrarily increased due to increased costs
within the athletic department. In a social welfare sense, the restrictions
promote the social ideal of equality of educational access and opportunity for
all student-athletes, not just those belonging to the lucrative sports of men’s
basketball and FBS football. Indeed, the Third Circuit has found that these exact
benefits are worth consideration in the antitrust context.
In U.S. v. Brown, MIT was sued by the United States Department of Justice
for establishing a program where certain Ivy League schools440 would
collectively agree to a single financial aid package that would be offered to each
prospective student.441 The program was designed to help economically
disadvantaged students, so financial aid packages were determined exclusively
on the basis of demonstrated need.442 MIT argued that the program increased
consumer choice by making Ivy League educations more accessible to a greater
number of students, particularly those that lack financial resources.443
Moreover, MIT argued that the program was also justified on social welfare
grounds by promoting the ideal of equality of educational access and
opportunity.444 The district court found the program to be in violation of
antitrust law.445 On appeal, the circuit court reasoned that “[i]t is most desirable
that schools achieve equality of educational access and opportunity in order that
more people enjoy the benefits of a worthy higher education” and “[t]here is no
doubt, too, that enhancing the quality of our educational system redounds to the
general good.”446 Accordingly, the circuit court held that the district court was

439. Here, the student-athletes would be the “consumers” for the purposes of antitrust review. The Ninth
Circuit and Northern District Court of California accepted the view of student-athletes as consumers in a
market where schools are selling educational and athletic opportunities. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 2015); O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F.
Supp. 3d 955, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
440. Those Ivy League schools were: MIT, Brown, Columbia, Cornell, Dartmouth, Harvard, Princeton,
the University of Pennsylvania, and Yale. U.S. v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 662 n.1 (3d Cir. 1993).
441. Id. at 661-63.
442. Id. at 662.
443. Id. at 674-75 (“[B]y increasing the financial aid available to needy students, [the Program] provided
some students who otherwise would have been able to afford an [Ivy League] education the opportunity to
have one.”).
444. Id. at 675.
445. Id. at 664.
446. Id. at 678.
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obliged to consider the economic and social welfare justifications offered by
MIT.447
In short, removing financial obstacles for the greatest number of talented
but needy students increases educational access, thereby widening consumer
choice. Enhancement of consumer choice is a traditional objective of the
antitrust laws and has also been acknowledged as a procompetitive benefit.448
The district court in Alston should feel equally as obliged to consider these
procompetitive justifications. Specifically, the court should consider the
justification that payment restrictions allow the NCAA to provide a greater
number of educational and athletic opportunities to many student-athletes that
would not exist if such payment restrictions were lifted.
VI. APPLICATION: ALSTON
The Northern District Court of California has demonstrated an
unwillingness to grant the NCAA that “ample latitude” that the Supreme
Court449 and Ninth Circuit450 have afforded the NCAA. The recent District
Court summary judgment decision is only the most recent example of that.
Based on the outcome of the summary judgment motion, it is unlikely that the
District Court will change course in issuing its verdict at the close of the Alston
trial.451 Thus, the application of this Comment may be more applicable to the
subsequent appeal made by the NCAA after an unfavorable outcome.
Regardless of the procedural posture, level of the court, or circuit in which
an antitrust claim is being brought against the NCAA, the points made in this
Comment should be taken into consideration. Below, I will illustrate how the
principles described above should be applied in Alston.

447. Id. at 661 (“[W]e hold that the district court erred by failing to adequately consider the
procompetitive and social welfare justifications proffered by MIT.”).
448. Id. at 675.
449. Recall the Supreme Court’s language in the seminal Board of Regents decision:
There can be no question but that [the NCAA] needs ample latitude to play [the critical role
of maintaining the revered tradition of amateurism in college sports], or that preservation
of the student-athlete in higher education adds richness and diversity to intercollegiate
athletics and is entirely consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
450. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1074 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e must
generally afford the NCAA ‘ample latitude’ to superintend college athletics.”).
451. “Judge Wilken has shown less deference to the NCAA than most judges, but this case and the fate
of the NCAA’s economic model will likely ultimately rest in the hands of the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme
Court.” Ralph D. Russo, NCAA Goes Back to Court, Defending Its Amateurism Rules, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/db8398e20f8d4f959591b622160e408c (quoting Director of Tulane
University’s Sports Law Program Gabe Feldman).
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The relevant market, per the summary judgment decision, is the market for
a college education combined with athletics, or alternatively the market for the
student-athletes’ services. Crucially, the student-athletes described belong to
the sports of FBS football and Division I men’s and women’s basketball—no
other sports are considered.452 Thus, the sought remedy only benefits those
stated sports and no others. As discussed, an injunction that allows prized
recruits to be paid in cash or in kind will result in increased financial burdens
on any given school. Also discussed, increased financial burdens often lead to
the removal of woman’s sports and other non-revenue generating sports.453
Therefore, the issues and proposed solutions mentioned in this Comment are
directly applicable.
The compensation restrictions were found to be anticompetitive as a matter
of law. Therefore, the burden will primarily be on the NCAA at trial to prove
the validity of its stated procompetitive justifications for the restrictions. As
mentioned, those procompetitive justifications are: (1) integration of academics
and athletics; and (2) preservation of amateurism in college sport, which
preserves its popularity by distinguishing it from professional sport.
The NCAA should argue that the benefits being derived in the revenue and
non-revenue generating sports justify the compensation restrictions. Because
the procompetitive justifications have been limited to those two stated above,
the NCAA will have to argue that non-revenue generating sports are enjoying
those benefits. More specifically, student-athletes in the non-revenue
generating sports are enjoying the benefits of having an integrated experience
and that, as amateurs, their athletic competition is preserved as a distinct form
of athletic participation as compared to professional sports. The NCAA must
further argue that neither of these benefits will materialize for non-revenue
generating sports whatsoever, if the compensation restrictions are lifted. This
is because many non-revenue generating sports will cease to exist in their
entirety due to the increased financial burden on many schools. The NCAA
should rely on the Sullivan decision for this argument, where procompetitive
benefits recognized in a closely related market were allowed to be considered
as justifications for restrictions in a separate market.454 Here, the restrictions in
the college education market for football and men’s basketball result in benefits
being realized in the closely related markets of non-revenue generating sports.
452. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 354,
at *8.
453. Id. The increased financial burdens also increase costs for the average collegiate student. See supra
notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
454. Recall that in Sullivan, the anticompetitive restrictions occurred in the market for public ownership
in NFL teams, yet the appellate court remanded the case for the district court to consider the benefits that exist
in the entertainment market as a result of the restrictions.
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Those benefits are having an integrated experience between academics and
athletics and a distinction between amateur and professional sports.
The NCAA may be unable to persuade the district court with this argument,
however. And it would not be surprising if they lost at trial. The NCAA relied
on these very same procompetitive justifications before this very same court
only a few years prior.455 The NCAA lost.
The NCAA’s best bet will be on appeal when they can restate the
procompetitive justifications that were dismissed at summary judgment.
Specifically, the NCAA should argue that the district court erroneously refused
to consider a compelling procompetitive justification—that of expanding
opportunities to all student-athletes:
The challenged rules serve the procompetitive goals of
expanding output in the college education market and
improving the quality of the collegiate experience for
student-athletes, other students, and alumni by maintaining the
unique heritage and traditions of college athletics and
preserving amateurism as a foundation principle, thereby
distinguishing amateur college athletics from professional
sports, allowing the former to exist as a distinct form of athletic
rivalry and as an essential component of a comprehensive
college education.456
Indeed, this is exactly what Defendant-MIT did in Brown when the district
court refused to consider their compelling procompetitive justification.457
First, the NCAA should argue that it was erroneous to dismiss the proffered
expanding opportunities procompetitive justification at summary judgment.
Expert testimony from both parties supported the notion that the NCAA should
be considered as a whole—a multi-side market that includes many participants
rather than a one-sided market that is constricted to only a few specific sports.
At the very least, an issue of fact on the matter exists. The procompetitive
justification should have survived summary judgment, becoming an issue for
the trier of fact of determine.
Second, the NCAA should rely on Sullivan to argue that benefits generated
in a closely related market are worthy of consideration. As discussed, Sullivan
demonstrates that courts must consider procompetitive impacts in closely
related markets. This argument is crucial. The relevant market remains the
455. See generally O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
456. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 354,
at *8.
457. See U.S. v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 675 (3rd Cir. 1993) (“[MIT claims] the district court
erroneously refused to consider compelling social welfare justifications.”).
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college education market for FBS football and Division I men’s and women’s
basketball. Thus, the NCAA must argue that benefits outside of this market can
be considered, specifically those benefits in a closely related market. The
closely related market would be student-athletes participating in non-revenue
generating sports. Sullivan allows such an argument. And, what’s more, the
Sullivan court relied on Ninth Circuit precedent—L.A. Memorial Coliseum
Commission v. NFL458—to permit the consideration of procompetitive benefits
being generated in closely related markets.459 L.A. Memorial Coliseum
Commission is binding precedent on the Ninth Circuit. Thus, the NCAA should
argue that the Court not only should consider those procompetitive benefits in
the closely related market, per Sullivan, but that it must consider them, per L.A.
Memorial Coliseum Commission.
Finally, with the expanded opportunity justification and non-revenue
generating sports being considered, the NCAA should return to Brown for
support. As mentioned, Brown stands for the proposition that equality of
educational access and opportunity is a procompetitive justification. Thus, the
NCAA’s compensation restrictions being made in an attempt to achieve
expanded access and opportunity to a quality higher education for all
student-athletes are procompetitive.
With these arguments, the NCAA invalidates the plaintiffs’ alleged less
restrictive alternatives. Recall that those were: (1) to allow conferences to
determine compensation packages; or (2) remove compensation restrictions
altogether. As discussed, the resulting compensation packages for
student-athletes would cause burdensome financial pressure for most schools.
Also discussed, many schools would respond by cutting non-revenue generating
sports. Because the removal of sports would be the outcome, thereby reducing
opportunities for student-athletes, the proposed “alternatives” do not serve the
same end of expanding opportunities for student-athletes as the compensation
restrictions do.
VII. CONCLUSION
The first recorded intercollegiate sporting event, between Harvard and Yale,
occurred over 150 years ago. There is arguably no other institution in the
country—including the NCAA itself—with the inextricable links to collegiate
athletics that both Harvard and Yale have; they were there from the beginning.
Today, both universities compete at the Division I level in all sports, but they

458. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1994).
459. Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1111 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing L.A. Memorial
Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1392, 1397, 1399 (9th Cir. 1994)).
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do not offer athletic scholarships. Neither school has extravagant athletic
facilities, nor do they have coaches that are paid millions of dollars. Rather,
these schools rely primarily on their academic values in appealing to prospective
Division I caliber student-athletes. These prospective student-athletes need
look no further than the Supreme Court Justices;460 United States Presidents;461
Congressmen and Congresswomen;462 and business executives463 produced by
Harvard and Yale to see the opportunities that await them. Indeed, amateurism
in its most pure form can be found at these two institutions, and their graduates
are compensated handsomely.
A dollar figure cannot be put on the value of a decent education. Courts
should take the opportunity to realize that paying student-athletes in cash, or in
kind, comes at a greater cost. Sports will be cut and access to higher education
will be restricted for many. Moreover, academic values will be subordinated to
short term financial gain. Student-athlete gain in being compensated does not
outweigh the resulting losses in educational values. “Basically, my position is
that coaches and administrators and the NCAA and everybody else needs to do
a better job in educating youngsters about the value of a degree, the value of an
education.”464 Indeed.
[I]n defending athletics I would not for one moment be
understood as excusing that perversion of athletics which
would make it the end of life instead of merely a means in life.
It is first-class, healthful play, and is useful as such. But play
is not business, and it is a very poor business indeed for a
college man to learn nothing but sport.

460. Each of the current Supreme Court Justices attended either Harvard or Yale, although Justice
Ginsburg ultimately graduated from Columbia after transferring from Harvard. Aaron Steckelberg, The
Current Supreme Court Justices Are All Ivy Leaguers, WASH. POST., Jan. 26, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/scotus-education/.
461. Harvard and Yale are first and second, respectively, in the ranking of colleges that have graduated
the most United States Presidents. Top Colleges for Presidential Graduates, BEST COLLEGES,
https://www.bestcolleges.com/features/most-us-presidents/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2018).
462. Harvard and Yale are first and third, respectively, in the ranking of colleges that have produced the
most members of Congress. Colleges That Produced the Most Members of Congress, HUFFINGTON POST
(Dec.
6,
2017),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/19/colleges-members-of-congressalumni_n_4818357.html.
463. Harvard and Yale are third and thirteen, respectively, in the ranking of colleges that have produced
the most Fortune 500 CEOs. Colleges with the Most Fortune 500 CEO Graduates, BEST COLLEGES,
https://www.bestcolleges.com/features/colleges-with-highest-number-fortune-500-ceo-graduates/
(last visited Dec. 13, 2018).
464. Ronald D. Mott, Student-Athlete Voices Join Pay-for-Play Debate, NCAA NEWS, Sept. 19, 1994, at
19,
https://ia801400.us.archive.org/31/items/NCAA-News-19940919/NCAA-News-19940919.pdf
(statement from former Baylor University Athletics Director and Head Coach Grant Teaff).
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Play while you play and work while you work, and though play
is a mighty good thing, remember that you had better never play
at all than to get into a condition of mind where you regard play
as the serious business of life, or where you permit it to hamper
and interfere with your doing your full duty in the real work of
the world.465
- President Theodore Roosevelt

465. President Theodore Roosevelt, supra note 1. Recall that this statement is made in the period
immediately after President Roosevelt initiated the changes that led to creation of the NCAA in his attempt to
preserve amateurism and reduce the unsavory violence in collegiate sport. Id.

